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We define continuous-time dynamics for exchange economies with fiat money.
Traders have locally rational expectations, face a cash-in-advance constraint,
and continuously adjust their short-run dominant strategy in a monetary
strategic market game involving a double-auction with limit-price orders.
Money has a positive value except on optimal rest-points where it becomes
a “veil” and trade vanishes. Typically, there is a piecewise globally unique
trade-and-price curve both in real and in nominal variables. Money is not
neutral, either in the short-run or long-run, and a localized version of the
quantity theory of money holds in the short-run. An optimal money growth
rate is derived, which enables monetary trade curves to converge towards
Pareto optimal rest-points. Below this growth rate, the economy enters a
(sub-optimal) liquidity trap where monetary policy is ineffective; above this
threshold inflation rises. Finally, market liquidity, measured through the
speed of real trades, can be linked to gains-to-trade, households’ expectations,
and the quantity of circulating money.
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1 Introduction
Most macroeconomic models reduce the aggregate economy to manageable propor-
tions, and usually a common simplification is the representation of each sector by agents
which behave identically. Consequently, they are presented in “representative agent” for-
mat. On the other hand, standard general equilibrium with heterogenous agents quickly
becomes intractable. Closed form solutions cannot be derived and their results are of-
ten not robust. The main impediment lies on the multiplicity of equilibria. A second
drawback is that the economy is assumed to be always at equilibrium while the theory
is unable to describe in a sensible way what happens out of equilibrium.
This paper extends the monetary paradigm set out in Dubey & Geanakoplos (1992)
and earlier working papers by providing a microfounded solution for the price discov-
ery process via a series of intermediate trades and establishes global uniqueness of the
solution paths. In doing so, we use novel but intuitive techniques that can be used in
subsequent research using the Mertens (2003) limit-price mechanism. The emergence
of the monetary gains-to-trade hypothesis to explain the speed and volume of trades
provides a direct roˆle for monetary policy in affecting market transactions and results
in a new interpretation for the quantity theory of money (qtm). While maintaining
market clearing and agent optimization, we follow the spirit (originating in Shubik &
Wilson (1977)) of introducing money in general equilibrium theory via a Central Bank.
At each intermediate trade, agents can borrow money from a Central Bank and take
part to a monetary double auction on the commodity market, sending limit-price orders
to a clearing house. However, being boundedly rational, households cannot solve the in-
tertemporal optimization programme of their future discounted utility: Given individual
expectations, they try to move in the direction of the steepest increase of their current
utility.1
Given the myopic behavior of households postulated in this paper, Lucas’s concept
of rational expectations needs to be adapted to our context. On the other hand, we have
learned from temporary equilibrium theory,2 that allowing for arbitrary “animal spirits”
(in the sense of Keynes) can prevent from getting locally unique equilibria. Here, the
main impact of expectations lies on the amount of money and commodities spent on
markets and, correspondingly, on savings. We shall assume that investors form locally
rational forecasts, and behave accordingly – a forecast being “locally rational” whenever
it is self-fulfilling in the short-run. This way of capturing households’ expectations
results into far-reaching consequences regarding the characterization of solution path of
our dynamics.
The striking feature of our model, indeed, is that it fully describes out-of-equilibrium
1The economic rationale for such myopic behavior can be traced back at least to Smale’s work
(1976a,b, 1977). As for its plausibility, recall that even chess grandmasters do not calculate more than
four or five moves ahead. It has also been suggested that, in situations such as chess, seeing further
does not mean seeing better (Gray & Geanakoplos (1991)). Finally, experience from financial market
desks shows that striving for the “local steepest increase” of one’s current P & L is indeed close to most
traders’ daily behavior.
2See Grandmont (2007) and the references therein.
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behaviour but, more importantly, it also possesses globally unique solution paths. Un-
like most, if not all, of olg and many General Equilibrium models that exhibit huge
degrees of indeterminacy, our framework produces globally unique trade paths solving
our dynamics. Thus, our approach is capable of providing an integrated framework to
conduct macroeconomic analysis and comparative dynamics without resorting to the
representative agent artifact with its well-established shortcomings.3 On the doctrinal
level, our approach also provides a new “New Classical synthesis” between Keynesian
wisdom (money is non-neutral, liquidity trap may occur) and the monetarist viewpoint
(qtm holds under certain circumstances).4 To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to combine all these features together: An Arrow-Debreu setting of out-of-
equilibrium behavior founded on a full-blown game-theoretic microstructure with non-
neutral money, global uniqueness of tractable solutions and some version of qtm.5
1.1 Gains-to-trade, expectations and money
The dynamics is driven, at each time instant, by a “tangent market” where agents
trade infinitesimal amounts of goods and maximize the first-order approximation of their
current utilities subject to a cash-in-advance constraint a` la Clower (1967).6 Hence, our
approach can be viewed as the monetary counterpart of the limit-price exchange process
introduced by Giraud (2004), which is itself a game-theoretic rewriting of Champsaur &
Cornet (1990).
Receipts from commodity sales cannot be used contemporaneously for purchases.
Therefore, in order to fulfill their cash-in-advance constraint, traders borrow money
from a loan market in anticipation of future income which is used to defray their loans.
Agents are endowed both with commodities as well as with some cash which is owned
free and clear of any debt. The aggregate of all private monetary holdings is the outside
money. The Central Bank loans money to agents who, in turn, repay after they have
received income from the sales of their commodities. Hence, for Central Bank issued
money, there exists an offsetting liability, which induces its exit from the economy. This
money is called inside money.7
A short-run interest rate is endogenously determined at each instant and clears the
money market. We exhibit necessary and sufficicient conditions under which the “classi-
cal dichotomy” holds in the short-run in the form of Fisher’s quantity theory of money,
provided there are effective trades. In particular, our localized version of the quantity
theory of money depends upon a “gains-to-trade” hypothesis first introduced by Dubey
& Geanakoplos (1992, 2003a, 2006). Consequently, when these conditions are fulfilled,
in the short-run, one can separate the real and nominal sides of the economy, solving
3Cf. e.g., Kirman (1992).
4See Giraud (2009) for a discussion of the present model within the history of dynamics in General
Equilibrum Theory (get).
5In addition, our dynamics is computable. The numerical aspects will be explored in a companion
paper.
6See also Grandmont & Youne`s (1972).
7The distinction between outside and inside money has been introduced by Gurley & Shaw (1960).
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the real side for relative prices, and fixing their levels by the stock of nominal money.
But this holds only in the short-run because the ratio of outside to inside money must
change over time in order to compensate for the diminution of gains to trade. Other-
wise, trades collapse, and the state of the economy remains stuck in a “liquidity trap”
at some (possibly second-best) commodity allocation. How the amount of inside money
changes, necessarily affects both nominal and real variables along every trade curve.
Finally, not only does money have value in our model,8 but its value is determinate. For
generic economies, the dynamics of interest rates, price levels and commodity allocations
is shown to be piecewise unique in forward time so that the non-neutral long-run effects
of monetary policy can in principle be tracked.9
Every Pareto-optimal price equilibrium is a rest-point of the dynamics. However, as
it is to be expected from a non-taˆtonnement approach,10 and even if there is no money,
there is no reason, in general, for such a rest-point to be an equilibrium of the economy
starting at some other state along the trade-curve. Thus, even in its non-monetary form,
our model is not a dynamical selection procedure of the Walrasian correspondence.
The main result of this paper is the following: The state of an economy always
converges towards some (locally) Pareto-optimal allocation provided the economy never
falls into a liquidity trap. Speaking somewhat less loosely, Theorem 3 below exhibits
an optimal growth rate of inside money Mt. If money grows sufficiently rapidly (given
households’ expectations and willingness to use their own private money), every trade
path will converge to some (locally) Pareto efficient rest-point. Otherwise, sooner or
later, the economy enters a liquidity trap, and stays there for good unless additional
inside money is injected in the system. Unlike M. Friedman’s golden rule, it turns out
that the optimal growth rate of inside money depends upon the local gains-to-trade
and households’ expectations. Broadly speaking, suppose that at time t households’
expectations are too pessimistic. Then, there will be no-trade whatever being the local
gains-to-trade available and the amount of circulating money: The economy sticks with
its current state as long as households don’t change their mind. Suppose, on the contrary,
that all gains-to-trade have already been exhausted. Then, whatever being players’
expectations and the quantity of circulating money, no-trade will again prevail. Finally,
suppose that the amount of inside money, Mt, injected in the economy by the Bank is so
tiny that the interest rate, r(t), is sufficiently large to overthrow every attempt from the
investors to take benefits from local gains to trade: Again, the economy remains stuck
at some inefficient state due to the lack of liquidity.
1.2 Nominal determinacy and liquidity
We partly follow the monetary paradigm as set out by Dubey & Geanakoplos (1992,
2003a,b) by considering households endowed with outside money together with a Central
Bank injecting inside money. However, we depart from their framework in as much as
1) we allow agents to send limit-orders (and not just market orders) to the market, and
8Which solves Hahn’s (1965) long-standing puzzle.
9In fact the whole dynamics is computable but we do not develop this feature here.
10See, e.g., Smale (1976).
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2) profits of the Central Bank from period t are redistributed to private shareholders
at time t + dt (cf. Shubik & Tsomocos (1992)). Hence, private shareholders cannot
instantaneously use the dividends of the Bank from time t as cash (outside money) in
order to finance their purchases of time t.
In a related monetary framework, Dre`ze & Polemarchakis (1999, 2000, 2001) also
assume that the Bank distributes its profits to private shareholders. Since they are in
a static one-shot world however, shareholders can instantaneously use them to finance
trades and pay their own debts to the Bank. As a consequence, there is no outside
money in their model, and nominal indeterminacy of static equilibria is the rule. The
exception is when the government budget constraint is violated, in which case Dre`ze &
Polemarchakis’ model would also result in nominal determinacy. In a sense, violation
of the government budget constraint is equivalent to existence of outside money. In the
present paper, the governement “violates” its budget constraint during a nano-second,
i.e., “between” t and t+dt. Hence, in contrast with Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a,b), the
exit of outside money is incipient in this paper because this money (being equal to the
Bank’s instantaneous profit) is reinjected in the economy every nano-second later. Thus,
unlike Dre`ze & Polemarchakis (2001, strong indeterminacy) and Dubey & Geanakoplos
(2003b, 2006, generic local uniqueness), we get (piecewise, generic) global uniqueness of
the monetary trade paths both in real and nominal terms.11
Finally, our approach sheds some light on the crucial issue of quantitative measures of
liquidity. Indeed, short-run interest rates turn out, in this paper, to play exactly the role
of repo rates. We show that the speed of real trades is a function of the ratio of inside to
outside money — itself equal to the repo rate. If this ratio is above a certain threshold,
the speed of trades will be maximal — in fact, it will be equal to the speed of Walrasian
trades in the barter version of our model (markets are perfectly liquid). If this ratio
is too low, then the speed of trades decreases and current interest rate increases — so
that markets become illiquid. Next, if the above ratio is below some critical value, then
trades collapse. An important point is that the critical threshold just alluded to depends
upon the size of local gains-to-trades and expectations. Put differently, the impact of the
amount of circulating money on market liquidity cannot be evaluated independently of
the real side of the economy: It is its interplay with (real) gains-to-trades and markets’
expectations that makes markets more or less liquid.
The next section presents the dynamics in details. We begin with the stripped-down
case of a barter exchange economy verifying standard interiority assumptions. Then,
in section 3, money is introduced, and the interiority restriction is dropped. Section 4
is devoted to our main results. In order to focus on the essentials, and using the fact
that markets are perfectly competitive, the game-theoretic foundation of the dynamics is
not emphasized before section 5 where we flesh-out our model with the micro-structure
underlying infinitesimal trades. The last section offers concluding remarks. The more
technical proofs are relagated in the Appendix.
11For an excellent discussion of the issue of indeterminacy, see Bloise & Polemarchakis (2006). See
also Tsomocos (2008).
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2 The dynamics
The state of an economy is viewed as a pointlike object that moves along paths which
are solution curves of a system of ordinary differential equations determined by various
force fields. Three vector fields are interacting together: 1) a scalar measure, γ(x), of
the real gains-to-trade locally available at an arbitrary allocation of goods x;12 2) a
vector field characterizing households’ expectations about the future; 3) the vector field
of outside and inside money quantifying how money is indeed “the grease that turns the
wheels of commerce”.
2.1 Barter economies
Let us introduce each field separately. We first consider a barter economy E :=
(ui, ωi)i=1,...,N verifying the following standard smoothness restrictions:
For each individual i = 1, ..., N , ui : RC++ → R denotes a C2-utility, defined on
his consumption set RC++, while ω ∈ RC++ denotes his inital endowment stock.
Suppose, for simplicity, that ui is smoothly strictly increasing, smoothly
concave, and verifies the usual boundary assumption {x ∈ RC+ : ui(x) =
ui(ωi)} ∩ ∂RC+ = ∅.
For this subsection, suppose, in addition, that, along a path of trades, investors
have no expectation about the future, hence are entirely myopic (this in order to focus
on the field of local gains-to-trade). When restricted to this class of economies, and
under the myopia assumption, our dynamics becomes similar to the ones firtst analyzed
by Champsaur & Cornet (1990), Bottazzi (1994) and Giraud (2004)13. That is, the
configuration set of the continous-time dynamics is given by the set of states x(t) :=
(xi(t))i ∈
(
RC++
)N
; at each instant t, when the state is x(t), individuals exchange
infinitesimal trades in a tangent market Tx(t)E : 〈−xi(t),∇ui(xi(t))〉i. The latter is
defined as a linear auxiliary economy with the same set of individuals 1, ..., N , the same
set of commodities 1, ..., C, except that, now, each individual’s set of trades is the shifted
cone: −xi(t) + RC++, his initial endowment is 0, and his short-run utility is:
vi(x˙i(t)) := ∇ui(xi(t)) · x˙i(t). (1)
In other words, in the tangent market Tx(t)E , trades are net, and i’s short-sale upper-
bound is given by his current stock xi(t).
14 Traders meet every time on the tangent
market, myopically trading in the direction of the steepest increase of their own, current
long-run utility. Each individual’s budget set is
p(t) · x˙i(t) ≤ 0, and x˙i(t) ≥ −xi(t), (2)
12This scalar was originally defined in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a).
13See also Smale (1976b) for a seminal contribution along the same line.
14One can think of xi(t) as implicitly playing the role of i’s collateral.
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while the macro-feasibility constaint on infinitesimal net trades is:
∑
i x˙i(t) = 0. The
cone of infinitesimal moves x˙i(t) is then given by the set of Walrasian allocations of
the linear economy Tx(t)E , taking place at the corresponding competitive price. The
dynamics is therefore given by the following ordinary differential inclusion:
(x˙(t), p(t)) ∈WE[Tx(t)E], x(0) = ω, p(0) arbitrary, (3)
where WE
[
Tx(t)E
]
is the subset of Walras equilibria of
[
Tx(t)E
]
.
Example 1.
The following example illustrates this simple dynamics in the standard, myopic Cobb-
Douglas case:
Tx(t)E :=
〈
− xi(t), (
√
x2i (t)
x1i (t)
,
√
x1i (t)
x2i (t)
)
〉
i
:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
I
θ
I
I
Fig. 1.The phase portrait of a barter, myopic Cobb-Douglas economy.
I
I
I
I
I
I
origin of 1
origin of 2
I
I
I
I
I
Here, the dynamics results in a smooth vector field, except on the diagonal of Pareto
allocations θ which coincides with the set of singular points – where trades cease, what-
ever being the direction from which the economy touches θ. It follows from the classical
Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem that, given initial condition ω, the dynamics admits a unique
integral curve (trade path), which converges in finite time towards some efficient allo-
cation in θ that depends smoothly upon ω. Moreover, prices adjust smoothly along the
trade path so as to be always orthogonal to the direction of move. Eventually, prices
converge towards the unique decentralizing price vector that turns the limit-allocation
into a price equilibrium.
At an arbitrary allocation of goods x, the crucial variable is the scalar measure γ(x)
of local gains-to-trade, which can be viewed, in the previous 2×2 example, as connected
with the ratio, (1 + γ(x))2, of slopes of the (linearized) indifference curves at x or,
equivalently, with the ratio of agents’ marginal rates of substitution for the two goods:
7
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 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
I
θ
I
q x
Fig. 2. (1 + γ(x))2 = the ratio of slopes of linearized indifference curves at x.
As long as x does not reach θ, γ(x) can be seen as the force driving the state. On the
contrary, when the contract curve θ is reached, γ(x) = 0, and trades vanish. The next
result is an immediate corollary of Theorem 3 below.
Proposition 1.—Under the standard smoothness restrictions on E, (3) ad-
mits solution paths (x(t), p(t))t, and each such trade path (x(t))t converges
to some Pareto efficient point x∗ ∈ θ while prices (p(t))t converge to some
price vector p∗ sustaining x∗.
Notice that the whole dynamics is entirely ordinal in the sense that it is based solely
on the local shape of households’ indifference curves. It does not depend upon the utility
functions ui used in order to represent households’preferences.
2.2 Locally rational expectations
Agents’ i expectations are captured through a saving function, si : S
C−1
+ ×RC++ → RC+
which associates to current endowment, xi(t), a bundle of saved commodities: 0 ≤
si[xi(t)] ≤ xi(t).15
Let us denote by δi(t) := xi(t) − si[xi(t)] the bundle of commodities that, given his
expectations, agent i is ready to put on the market at time t. Of course,16
0 ≤ δi(t) ≤ xi(t). (4)
A tangent market Tx(t),δ(t)E is defined in the same way as in the previous case, except
that the budget constraint (2) is replaced by:
p(t) · x˙i(t) ≤ 0, and x˙i(t) ≥ −δi(t), (5)
15For the sake of realism, we could let si[·] depend upon time and, say, upon some statistics over past
prices. Besides leading to a non-autonomous dynamical system, this would not qualitatively change the
results.
16The constraint (4) amounts to requiring investors to be able to physically exhibit their claimed
collateral, which is consistant with the Shapley-Shubik approach (Giraud (2003)).
8
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When people’s expectations become so pessimistic that δi(t) = 0, every i, then no-trade
will occur in the tangent market.17 The myopic economy of the previous subsection
corresponds to the particular no-saving case: δi(t) = xi(t), every t and i. The dynamics
with expectations is now given by:
(x˙(t), p(t)) ∈WE[Tx(t),δ(x)E], x(0) = ω, (p(0), δ(0)) arbitrary. (6)
Example 1 (continued)
Back to the Cobb-Douglas workhorse, suppose that ω1 = (1, 4), ω2 = (4, 1), and that,
due to some shock in expectations, agent 1 anticipates, at t, an increase in the relative
price of commodity x2. He should increase the quantity of commodity x2 saved for later
use, so that δx
2
1 (t) should decrease. The result, as can be readily checked, is that the
relative price px2(t) will, indeed, be larger than it would have been, had player 1 not
refrained from sending commodity x2 to the market. As a consequence, 1’s expectation
has been momentarily confirmed, at least locally in time. This is the sense in which we
shall say that investors, in this paper, entertain “locally rational expectations”.
Next, if player 1 constantly anticipates px2(t) to relatively increase (in a broad sense)
w.r.t. px1(t), while player 2 remains myopic, then, at time t, the tangent market will
look like:
Tx(t),δ(t)E :=
〈
− δi(t), (
√
x2i (t)
x1i (t)
,
√
x1i (t)
x2i (t)
)
〉
i
,
with δ2(t) = x2(t), δ
x1
1 (t) = x
1
1(t), and 0 < δ
x2
1 (t) < x
x2
1 (t). As the following portrait
phase shows, the resulting trade path (in red) will follow a curve quite different from
its myopic benchmark (the green straight line), and end up in θ at a point that is more
favorable to 1.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
θ
I
@
@
@
@
@
I
ωq
Fig. 3.The impact of expectations in the barter Cobb-Douglas economy.
17This, in a way, echoes the well-known “autarkic equilibrium” of strategic market games, cf. Giraud
(2003). It is not unrelated to the “trauma” currently faced by markets for exotic assets, and especially
for credit derivatives.
9
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Notice that, along the trade path, the relative price of commodity x2 constantly decreases
with respect to the price of x1. Hence, although they are locally confirmed (in the sense
that px2(t) would decrease more rapidly if player 1 was not anticipating it to increase),
1’s expectations are globally contra-cyclical in this example. Notice also that, if, on the
contrary, 1 entertains pro-cyclical expectations about the price of commodity x2, the
resulting trade-path will be identical to the myopic benchmark (this property, of course,
is peculiar to this example). Finally, when the economy touches θ, trades vanish and
prices remain constant, so that the investors’ expectations may still be regarded as being
locally confirmed. Hence, there is a genuine interplay between the field of local gains-to-
trade and that of expectations. To put it somewhat vaguely: the larger the local gains-
to-trade, the stronger the impact of expectations. Direct verification also shows that,
whenever the two agents of the Cobb-Douglas economy have “isomorphic” expectations
(in the sense that there exists a common 0 < λ ≤ 1 such that δi(t) = λxi(t), i = 1, 2,
every t), then the resulting trade paths are identical to those of the myopic case, except
that the speed of trades is reduced by a factor λ. Indeed, isomorphic savings on the part
of both traders amounts to rescaling the unit of commodities in every tangent market,
say from pounds to ounces, but leaves invariant the direction of moves. This captures a
phenomenon observed again during the recent subprime crisis: the lack of confidence in
the future may induce a decrease in the velocity of trades. Moreover, it implies that the
“myopic” trade path can be adopted as a benchmark, with respect to which differences
in actual trade paths are only due to differences in traders’ expectations. The next result
is also a straightforward corollary of Theorem 3 below.
Proposition 2.— Under the standard smoothness restrictions, (6) admits
solution paths. Provided that, for every household i, expectations verify:
δi(t) > 0 a.e. t, every such trade path (x(t))t converges to some Pareto
efficient point x∗ ∈ θ while prices (p(t))t converge to some corresponding
sustaining price p∗.
3 Monetary economies
We now introduce money and drop the standard smoothness restrictions. Throughout
the rest of this paper, the real long-run economy is defined by E = (ui, ωi)i, with ωi > 0,
ω :=
∑
i ωi >> 0, each ui being differentiable over the subset Xi = {xi ∈ RC+ | ∃x−i ∈(
RC+
)N
: (xi, x−i) ∈ τ} with
τ :=
{
x ∈ (RC+)N | ∑
i
xi = ω and ui(xi) ≥ ui(ωi) ∀i
}
(7)
being the subset of feasible and individually rational allocations. Throughout the rest of
this paper, we also suppose that, whenever defined, each gradient verifies: ∇ui(xi) > 0.
Regarding the monetary sector of the economy, at time t, each agent i has some
private endowment mi(t) of outside fiat money, of which he is ready to put µi(t) ≤
10
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mi(t) on the tangent market. Given his expectations, he may indeed choose to keep
some precautionary quantity of outside money in his pocket – in which case, µi(t) <
mi(t). Since default is not allowed in this paper, µi(t) ≥ 0 anyway, every i and every t.
Households’ expectations are thus defined through a saving function, si : RC+ → RC+1+
which associates to each current endowment, xi(t), a bundle of saved commodities:
si ≤ xi(t), and a scalar cash-holding σi(t) := mi(t)− µi(t).
At each time t, the quantity M(t) ≥ 0 of inside money is injected in the system by
the Central Bank, according to some exogenously given monetary policy. Outside money
is owned by households free and clear of debt. Inside money is always accompanied by
debt when it comes into households’ hands. The aggregate stock of outside money held
by investors at time t is m(t) =
∑
imi(t). The aggregate flow of money that investors
are ready to put on the market at time t is µ(t) =
∑
i µi(t). Let r(t) ∈ R+ stand for
time’s t intra-period (or instantaneous) rate of interest on the Bank loan.
In the rest of this subsection, we provide some details about monetary infinitesimal
trades. The impatient reader may immediately move on to subsection 2.3. now, where
a reduced-form of our dynamics is to be found.
3.1 The budget set with fiat money
Infinitesimal trades take place on the monetary tangent market Tz(t)E , defined as a
monetary linear economy with N agents and C commodities, each agent being equipped
with the cone, −δi(t) + RC+, of infinitesimal trades, 0-endowment in commodities, mi
Euros in his pocket, and the short-run utility, vi(·), defined by (1).
For the sake of clarity, consider each instant t as being divided into three subperiods.
In the first one, say tα, investors borrow inside fiat money from the Bank, say by selling
IOU notes or bonds. The quantity of inside money borrowed by agent i depends upon
his expectations, the quantity µi(t) of outside money he decided to spend and on the
stock, M(t), of inside money injected by the Bank. In the second subperiod, tβ, house-
holds trade real commodities against money. In the third, tγ , they repay Bank loans
with money according to the rate r(t). All commodity markets meet simultaneously in
subperiod tβ. The difference with the barter case is that, now, households are imposed
a cash-in-advance constraint, that is, they have to pay money in order to purchase com-
modities. It is only in the third interval, after commodity markets close, that revenue
from the sales of commodities come into households’ hands, by which time it is too late
to use these revenues for purchase. Those households who, at time tα, find their cash
available for trades, µi(t), insufficient (say, because of their expectations about future
prices or about future interest rates) will therefore need to borrow money from the Bank
in order to finance purchases, and will defray the loan out of their sales revenues.
The price of money at time tα is
1
pc(t)
in terms of commodity c, and (1 + r(t)) in
terms of money at time tγ . As r(t) → −1, money-now (i.e., at time tα) loses all value
in terms of money-later (at time tγ). Conversely, when r(t) → +∞ money-later loses
all value in terms of money-now. Finally, when r(t) = 0, money-now and money-later
become equal.
11
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Suppose that agent i borrows m˜i(t) Euros at time tα by promising to pay (1 +
r(t))m˜i(t) at tγ , after commodity trades. Since trades are net, the budget constraint
now is (compare with (5)):
p(t) · x˙i(t) ≤ m˜i(t) + µi(t) and x˙i(t) ≥ −δi(t). (8)
Next, at time tβ, all commodities are traded simultaneously, and the cash-in-advance
constraint of agent i is given by:18
p(t) · x˙+i (t) ≤ m˜i(t) + µi(t) (9)
which says that total money spent on purchases cannot exceed the money on hand,
i.e., money borrowed plus money endowed (and not deliberately saved as cash-holding).
Notice that (9) implies the first part of (8). We therefore synthetize both constraints
into a single “monetary constraint”:
p(t) · x˙+i (t) ≤ m˜i(t) + µi(t) and x˙i(t) ≥ −δi(t). (10)
Outside trade curves that are solutions of our dynamics, it may well be the case
that some investor happens to be surprised by unforseen prices p(t) or by an unexpected
interest rate r(t), and hence need to draw money from his saving σi(t) in order to be able
to deliver on his loan. In case his saving was zero (µi(t) = mi(t)), then this household
would be forced to default. According to the definition of locally rational expectations
given in this paper, this never happens along a trade path solving our dynamics: Every
household must fully deliver on its loan at every time without touching his hoarded
cash-holding at this very period, i.e.,19
(1 + r(t))m˜i(t) ≤ p(t) · [x˙i(t)]− + ∆(9), (11)
where ∆(9) is the difference between the right- and the left-hand sides of inequality
(9). Given (δi(t), µi(t)) ∈ RC+1+ and market prices (p(t), r(t)) ∈ RC+1+ , the budget set
B(p(t), r(t), δi(t), µi(t)) of household i on monetary tangent markets at time t consists
of all market actions (m˜i(t), x˙
i(t)) that satisfy (10) and (11).
At the macro-level, monetary infinitesimal trades in the monetary tangent market
are feasible when they verify the following clearing equations:∑
i
m˜i(t) = M(t) (12)
and ∑
i
x˙i(t) = 0. (13)
18Here, x+ :=max{x, 0}.
19x− :=max{−x, 0}.
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3.2 Interest rate: basic properties
The commodity market clearing condition (13) guarantees that the total stock of
commodities x(t) = (xi(t))i is conserved and redistributed among consumers according
to current infinitesimal trades – that is, the economy never leaves the boundary of the
feasible set τ (see (7)). And (13) multiplided by p(t) shows that the aggregate flow
of money used for trades,
∑
i(m˜i(t) + µi(t)), is conserved and also redistributed among
investors as counterpart of their real trades. Thus, after trades have occured within time
t, all of M(t) +m(t) is with households. The no-default condition (11) then implies that
the total debt of households does not exceed M(t)+µ(t). At the end of time t, the Bank
holds (1+r(t))M(t) ≤M(t)+µ(t), and investors hold the balance plus their own, private
precautionary money saving: µ(t)−r(t)M(t)+∑i σi(t). Hence, the instantaneous profit
of the Bank at time t is r(t)M(t). On the other hand, the aggregate stock of outside
cash available for trades, µ(t), remains constant across the various time intervals within
t, whoever it belongs to. Hence, at least M(t) +µ(t) is owed to the Bank. Along a trade
path solving our dynamics, no more can be owed to the Bank since investors never need
to draw money from their saving (cf. (11)). Whence (1+r(t))M(t) = M(t)+µ(t), i.e.,20
r(t) =
µ(t)
M(t)
. (14)
This shows that the interest rate r in our monetary dynamics is determined by
the interaction between the real and the monetary sector solely through the interplay
between the stocks of inside and outside money together with households’ expectations.
Obviously, we must have 0 ≤ m˜i(t) ≤ M . We shall impose as part of the trading
rules on each tangent market that, whenever µ(t) 6= 0:
m˜i(t) :=
µi(t)
µ(t)
M(t) =
µi(t)
r(t)
. (15)
This can be justified as a weakening of the rational expectations hypothesis, applied
to period t. Suppose, indeed, that investors were able to perfectly anticipate p(t) and
r(t) from period tα on. On account of their being no inter-period charged interest rate,
after repaying the Bank at tγ , no household would be left with more money, σi(t),
than it decided to save (given his rational expectations), otherwise it should have spent
more money at time tβ to purchase commodities, or else curtailed its sales, improving
its short-run welfare. Hence, the no-default constraint (11) should be satisfied as an
equality:
p(t) · x˙i(t) = µi(t)− r(t)m˜i(t). (16)
A little reflections shows that the right-hand side of (16) would also be nonnegative.
Indeed, suppose the contrary: This means that player i would have to finance part of
the cost, r(t)m˜i(t), of his loan by his sales p · x˙i(t). But he could do so, again, by
20With the convention 0
0
:= 0.
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borrowing less money (i.e., selling a smaller quantity of bonds to the Bank for inside
money), and saving a larger part of his current endowment, improving again his short-
run welfare. Now, (16), (13) and µi(t) − r(t)m˜i(t) ≥ 0, every i, imply (15) for every
household i. In this paper, we shall not assume that investors share perfect foresight
within each period t, but we simply impose (15).21
As a consequence of (15), the no-default condition (11) can now be written as a
standard budget constraint in net trades:
p(t) · x˙i(t) ≤ 0, (17)
so that the various monetary constraints faced by agent i can be summarized by (10)
and (17). Obviously, when µi(t) = 0, i must finance his trades with borrowed money.
If, however, µ > 0, then m˜i = 0, and player i cannot trade. If, on the other hand,
M(t) = 0, there is no Bank money available, and no-trade prevails for everybody. Next,
when M(t)→ +∞, the interest rate vanishes, so that (11) is trivially satisfied, as well as
(9) (up to a normalization of prices), and (8) becomes the unique remaining constraint.
We are then back to the barter case. Finally, if investor i anticipates an increase in the
interest rate, he should save less money at time tα, since, ceteris paribus, he will have
to pay more for his loans. And, indeed, an increase in µi(t) induces an increase in r(t)
as shown by (14) – another local confirmation of the rationality of i’s expectations.
What happens to the Bank’s current profit, r(t)M(t) = µ(t) at time t ? We assume,
in this paper, that it is distributed at (t + dt)α to its private shareholders according to
some fixed ownership structure (νi)i ∈ (0, 1]N , such that
∑
i νi = 1. Therefore, the whole
stock of outside money µ(t) that was initially put on the market by households will return
to them in the form of dividends. As a consequence, variations in the aggregate amount,
µ(t), of outside money available for trades are solely due to the investors’ expectations:
Whenever those expectations are constant across time, the stock µ(t) remains constant.
Moreover, the rate r(t) is determined solely by the aggregate amounts, µ(t) and M(t), of
outside and inside money available for trades. It is therefore affected by the real sector
only through the canal of expectations.22 On the other hand, the cash received from the
Bank as dividends at time t (arising from profits induced by time tα infinitesimal loans)
is received by shareholders only at time (t + dt)α.
23 Consequently, the stock of outside
money hold by agent i must satisfy the following differential equation:
m˙i(t) = νir(t)M(t)− µi(t)− p(t) · x˙i(t) = νiµ(t)− µi(t)− p(t) · x˙i(t). (18)
Indeed, according to (16), p(t) · x˙i(t) is the amount of cash that may have been lost by
agent i at the end of period t. It will turn out, however, that along a trade curve solving
21It can also be interpreted as follows: at tα, each investor i sends µi Euros to the clearing house as a
collateral in order to borrow money from the Bank, and is served at the prorata of his contribution to
the sum µ of outside cash.
22A noteworthy consequence is that changes in the interest rates are solely due to changes in expecta-
tions. Hence, investors’ expectations about r(t) can be viewed in our model as expectations about their
opponents’ changes in expectations.
23A general (static) formulation where shares of ownership are endogenously determined can be found
in Shubik & Tsomocos (1992).
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our dynamics, (16) is verified as an equality, so that the dynamics of individual endowed
money reduces to:
m˙i(t) = νiµ(t)− µi(t). (19)
3.3 A local Quantity Theory of Money
Summing (10) over i, and using (12) yields the following (localized) version of Irwing
Fisher’s celebrated quantity theory of money:
µ(t) +M(t) ≥ p(t) ·
(∑
i
x˙+i (t)
)
, (20)
provided trades are effective, that is:
∑
i x˙
+
i (t) 6= 0.24 Whenever households perfectly
anticipate (p(t), r(t)) so that (10) is binding for every i, then (20) will be satisfied as
an equality. This, however, need not always be the case along a trade curve solving
our dynamics, as the local rationality of households’ expectations is too weak to ensure
that no household will never use less money to finance its purchases than it initially
intended to. Thus, people’s bounded rationality is responsible for (20) being only a
weak inequality in general. We shall see, nevertheless, that this does not prevent our
monetary theory from exhibiting “monetarist” features under certain circumstances that
are specified by Theorem 3 below.
Notice that, in (20), income corresponds to infinitesimal sales and not to initial
endowments. Moreover, at variance with the textbook analysis of Fisher’s equation, and
apart from the quantity M(·) of inside money, (20) only involves endogeneous variables:
infinitesimal trades x˙(t), as well as prices p(t) and available cash µ(·) are all determined
by the three forces at work – local gains-to-trade, expectations and money. Being stated
in the tangent bundle of τ , our quantity theory of money involves only flows (and no
stock). Finally, the velocity, V , of money is often understood as being given by
MV = PT. (21)
When compared literally, (20) and (21) might seem to mean that V is constantly equal
to 1 in our theory. This is not the interpretation followed here. Rather, we consider that
the velocity of circulating money is not constant in general, and can be measured by the
speed of trades, ||∑i x˙+i (t)||, which is in turn endogenously determined by the interaction
of gains-to-trade, expectations and money. More precisely, the money velocity depends
upon the quantity of money spent: µ(t) +M(t).25 As more money is spent, the volume
of infinitesimal trades increases, and so does the velocity of money. Conversely, when
the amount of money saved (for precautionary or speculative purposes, given investors’
24When this latter condition is not satisfied, no-trade prevails, prices are indeterminate and the qtm
breaks down.
25A similar interpretation is suggested by Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a). Equivalently, µ(t) can be
interpreted as depending upon fiscal policy and M(t) upon monetary policy, so that these two classical
tools can be related to the velocity of money.
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expectations) increases, the speed of trades decreases, and so does the velocity of money:
It can even reduce to 0, in which case the economy enters a liquidity trap. We will show
(see Theorem 3 below) that, under certain circumstances, a change in M (money stock)
might be absorbed by an offsetting change in V (velocity of circulation) and therefore
may not be transmitted to P (price level). Likewise, a change in income or the volume
of market transaction might be accommodated by a change in velocity without requiring
any change in the money supply. Restated in the setting of (20), it turns out that, at
any feasible state, there is a threshold at which an increase of M(t) (or µ(t)) results
in an increase of the speed of trades and not in an increase of prices. Then, however,
any further increase of money will induce inflation and no real effect. Thus, (20) turns
out to induce a doctrinal mixture where both Keynesian and monetarist viewpoints are
“locally” right.
3.4 Monetary flows
At each time t, the state of the monetary economy E is the collection
z(t) := (x(t), δ(t),m(t), µ(t),M(t)).
The configuration space, M := τ × (RC+1+ )N × RN+1+ , is the set of feasible states of
our dynamics, i.e., of feasible allocations in commodities, savings, and stocks of money
(x, δ,m, µ,M) with
∑
imi = m, 0 ≤ δi ≤ xi and 0 ≤ µi ≤ mi.
3.4.1 The need for a new solution concept
Despite its long-standing tradition, the standard Walrasian allocation can no longer
serve as a solution concept for tangent markets. Indeed, it is well-known that, whenever
agents do not have strictly increasing preferences and interior endowments, Walrasian
allocations may fail to exist in linear economies. The restriction δi(t) > 0 (a.e. t) used
in Proposition 2 to avoid this situation is obviously too strong, as it imposes some form
of long-standing “optimism” on the part of every agent that conflicts with everyday
experience, at least since 2008. On the other hand, even whenever they exist, Walras
equilibria are usually not unique (even though the corresponding normalized competitive
price is unique26). So that there is no hope for recovering a unique solution path out of
the differential inclusion (6). Thus, we shall replace the simple Walrasian concept by a
generalized equilibrium solution, introduced by Mertens (2003), and tailored-made for
linear economies. This will provide us with a more accurate and operational definition
of infinitesimal flows x˙ and prices p for every tangent market Tx(E).
Mertens’ (2003) solution concept can be alternatively viewed as a stylized double
auction27 or as a member of the family of hierarchic equilibria28. Since its definition may
look rather “dry”, and will be further complicated by the introduction of the monetary
26For all these classical results regarding linear economies, cf. Cornet (1989).
27Its game-theoretic interpretation is provided in section 5 below.
28see Florig (2001).
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field, let us begin by presenting it by a couple of informal remarks. First, it is restricted
to linear exchange economies. This, however, is harmless since, in this paper, tangent
markets are already linear. Second, every traditional competitive equilibrium of a linear
economy is still a solution in the sense of Mertens’ (2003). Third, the latter yields a
non-vacuous solution concept even when Walras allocation fail to exist.
Example 2.
Consider the following two-agent tangent market with
C = 2, v1(x˙1, x˙2) = x˙1, v2(x˙1, x˙2) = x˙2, δ1 = (1, 0), δ2 = (2, 3).
This economy admits no Walras allocation, and a little reflection reveals that the unique
“reasonable” outcome should be no-trade. Indeed, agent 2 is solely interested in com-
modity x2, while agent 1 decided to save his entire endowment in commodity x2, hence
has a zero short-sale upper-bound in this very commodity. This means that agent 1
refuses to sell any positive amount of the unique commodity that his counterpart is
ready to buy. The situation is plotted in the Edgeworth box of Figure 2 (where gi is the
gradient vector of agent i):
q0 →
g1
→
g2
- -
- -
Fig. 4. A tangent market with no Walras allocation.
Mertens’ (2003) solution for this example coincides with no trade, while competitive
equilibria simply fail to exist.
3.4.2 Pseudo-flows
Let’s now formally define the flow induced by the local interaction of traders within
the double auction regulating trades in the monetary tangent market Tz(t)E . It describes
the flow of commodities at time t —hence the move, x˙(t), that characterizes changes
in the households’ stocks of commodities— as well as the instantaneous price vector at
which these infinitesimal changes occur.29 To simplify notations, we drop the time index
in this subsection. On the other hand, the finite set of traders is interpreted as a finite set
of types, each type being represented by a unit interval, [0, 1], of identical individuals,
29The flow of outside money is given by (18). That of inside money, M˙(t), is exogenously defined
by the Central Bank’s policy, as we differ the strategic analysis of the Bank’s behavior to a subsequent
work.
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equipped with the restriction, λ, of the Lebesgue measure. The set of individuals is
therefore
(
[0, 1]N , λ⊗N
)
.
Definition 1. (a) A monetary pseudo-flow of TzE is a price, p ∈ RC+ \ {0}, a fea-
sible N -tuple of borrowed money (m˜i)i ∈ RN+ , and a feasible infinitesimal net trade in
commodities, x˙ ∈ (RC+)N , such that:
(i) For every individual i, p · ∇ui(xi) = 0 implies x˙i = 0. Moreover, if µ > 0,
then m˜i verifies (15) for every i: m˜i = (µi/µ)M.
(ii) For every i, x˙i maximizes vi(x˙) subject to the cash-in-advance (10) and
budget constraints (17):
x˙ ≥ −δi, p · x˙ ≤ 0, p · x˙+ ≤ m˜i + µi, and
(
pc = 0⇒ x˙ci = 0
)
. (22)
(iii) For every commodity c, pc = 0 implies that, for a.e. i,
(
p · δi > 0 ⇒
vci = 0
)
.
(b) (p, x˙) is a first-order pseudo-flow if furthermore a.e. trader i maximizes his utility
vi subject to (22), i.e., if p
c = 0⇒ vci = 0 for a.e. i.
If µi = 0 while µ > 0, then i has no endowed money and can no more borrow
Bank money (because of (15)). Hence, the cash-in-advance constraint (10) implies that
i is excluded from trades. On the other hand, when restricted to the subset of actors
{i : p · δi > 0 or (pc = 0 ⇒ vci = 0)} (in particular, when p >> 0 or ∇ui(xi) >> 0,
every i), then every pseudo-flow (p, x˙) is of first-order. If, in addition, µ = 0 but M > 0,
then r = 0, the cash-in-advance constraint vanishes and (p, x˙) reduces to a pair of
Walras allocations (in net trades) and price ratios of the linear economy TzE . The same
outcome obtains dually whenever M → ∞ while µ > 0. Then, indeed, r → 0+ and, at
the limit, the final infinitesimal trades induced by a pseudo-flow are not different from
the Walrasian net trades obtained in TzE in an idealized world without money at all,
where prices only have the meaning of exchange rates between pairs of commodities.
Finally, if µ = M = 0, no-trade is the unique outcome.
The first virtue of monetary pseudo-flows, however, is that they exist under much
more general circumstances than competitive equilibria, as shown by Lemma 1.30
30Pseudo-flows are also close to the concept of “monetary equilibrium” defined by Dubey & Geanako-
plos (2003a). The differences are the following: (a) Pseudo-flows are tailored only for linear economies
while monetary equilibria make sens for more general concave economies. (b) Equation (15) defining
borrowed money is imposed for µ > 0 at a pseudo-flow. (c) The basic Shapley & Shubik (1977) mech-
anism which serves to define prices and allocations (given offers and bids) at a monetary equilibrium
is replaced, here, by Mertens’ (2003) limit-price mechanism. These changes provide us with a solution
even in situations where monetary equilibria would fail to exist and which is globally unique in most
cases of interest.
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Lemma 1.— (a) Every monetary tangent market TzE admits a monetary
pseudo-flow.
(b) Every such pseudo-flow verifies: p · x˙i = 0, a.e. i.
Proof of Lemma 1. (a) If µ = 0 and M = 0, no-trade is the unique pseudo-flow.
If µ = 0 and M > 0, a monetary pseudo-flow boils down to a “pseudo-equilibrium”
(in the sense of Mertens (2003)) of TzE , expressed in net trades. Existence of such
pseudo-equilibria follows from Mertens (2003, Lemma 3). If, now, µ > 0, then all the
traders i for whom µi = 0 can be ignored since x˙i = 0. Consider the restriction of
the linear economy TzE to those individuals i with µi > 0. If, in Definition 1(i), the
cash-in-advance constraint p · x˙+ ≤ m˜i + µi is temporarily omitted, then the part (p, x˙)
of a monetary pseudo-flow reduces, once again, to a “pseudo-equilibrium” in net trades.
Such a pseudo-equilibrium is defined up to a normalization constant λ > 0 for prices. It
therefore only remains to check that we can choose λ so that λp · x˙+ ≤ m˜i+µi is fulfilled
for every i. This is easy since, by construction, m˜i +µi > 0 for every i (in the restricted
economy).
(b) According to Def. 1(ii), pc = 0⇒ x˙ci = 0. Thus, we can ignore commodities with
zero price, i.e., we assume p >> 0. It then follows from the short-run utility maximization
of Def1.(ii) that p · x˙i = 0. 
The equality p · x˙i = 0 means that, along a trade curve solving our dynamics, an
investor i is never forced to spend more money µi(t) than he initially decided to (for a.e.
time t). This confirms our rewriting of the dynamics of individual outside money (19),
hence the fact that m(t) remains constant across time.
3.4.3 Proportional rationing
The price to pay for the previous easy existence proof is the huge indeterminacy of
pseudo-flows. We shall therefore impose two restrictions: Taken together, they will
provide us with the desired global uniqueness of the flow for each tangent market. What
Definition 1 actually captures is how the price is determined by the clearing house
(“teneur de marche´”) computing the market supply and demand functions, and settling
at the intersection. In case of several possible quantities on the intersection, our first
restriction is to assume that the clearing house follows a “proportional rationing”:31 All
buyers whose (short-run) utility equals the market price get their orders executed in
the same proportion, and similarly for all sellers. Formally, a monetary pseudo-flow is
proportional whenever it verifies:
For every pair of items (c, c′) ∈ NC+1, with non-zero prices, there exists
mcc′ ≥ 0 s.t.
a) mcc′ +mc′c > 0;
b) mc1c2mc2c3mc3c1 = mc1c3mc3c2mc2c1 (consistency);
31See Mertens (2003) for a game-theoretic foundation of the proportionality rule.
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c) all agents i with non-zero utility whose demand set verifies Dip(∇ui) 3
{c, c′} receive commodities c and c′ in quantities proportional to mcc′ and
mc′c, where the demand set of i at price p is
Dip(∇ui) :=
{
` | p` ≤
(∂ui
∂x`
/
∂ui
∂xk
)
pk, ∀k = 1, ..., C
}
.32 (23)
In Example 2 supra, no-trade is also a proportional pseudo-flow: condition c) above
is vacuously satisfied. In the next example, the proportional rule is effectively at work:
Example 3. g1 = g2 = (1, 1), δ1 = (2, 1), δ2 = (1, 3). Suppose, for simplicity, that
r = 0. Then, P (TzE) = {(1, 1)} while the unique proportional first-order pseudo-flow
lies at the intersection of the Pareto set with the first diagonal of the Edgeworth box.
More precisely, the weights are mxy = 3 and myx = 4, and x˙
∗
1 = (
9
7 ,
12
7 ), x˙
∗
2 = (
12
7 ,
16
7 ).
r0
rx˙∗
Fig 5 The proportional rule.
Our second restriction concerns the absolute level of prices and the volume of infinites-
imal trades. Obviously, there are several ways of choosing λ in the proof of Lemma 1.
On the other hand, in the same way as a movie can be runned more or less slowly,
a trade curve x(·) solving our dynamics can be traced at various speeds: Definition 1
does not convey any “natural” scale for x˙(t) — except that the short-sale constraints
imply: x˙i(t) ≥ −δi(t), every i. When µ(t) > 0, we shall therefore assume that the clear-
ing house maximizes the aggregate volume of trades:
∑
i |x˙+i (t)| – a current practice
32With the convention x
0
:= 0.
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in real-life clearing houses. That this optimization problem admits a (unique) solution
is guaranteed by the individual short-sale constraints. This amounts to rescaling the
units of a commodity flow, say from ounces to pounds, and taking the available stocks
of commodities (whose units is given a priori in the long-run economy E) as absolute
upper-bounds for this rescaling.33 Once this is done, it remains to choose the absolute
level of prices so as to maximize λ > 0 under the individual cash-in-advance constraints
p·x˙+ ≤ µi(1+Mµ ), every i.34 A proportional pseudo-flow whose price level has been fixed
according to this rule is called a quasi-flow. The example from subsection 4.4. below
clarifies how the whole mechanism works.
Definition 2. A monetary flow (p, x˙) of Tz(t)E is then defined by means of Mertens’
algorithm:35 select any quasi-flow (p, x˙), next start again with the truncated economy
restricted to {c : pc = 0}, as long as this set is non-empty. Since there are finitely
many commodities, the algorithm must have an end. Moreover, the price p, induced by
a monetary flow, must belong to RC++. The uniqueness of Mertens’ (2003) solution also
yields the uniqueness of the monetary flow, at least in terms of trades.
Lemma 2.— Regardless of the partition of commodities chosen at every step,
Mertens’ algorithm produces the same final commodity flow x˙. Unless x˙ = 0
or µ = 0, the corresponding price p is unique.
Proof of Lemma 2. When µ > 0 and x˙ 6= 0 (which means M > 0), the uniqueness of
x˙ and of the price ratios (λp)λ>0 follows from Mertens (2003, section 3). The uniqueness
of m˜i follows from (15), and that the vector price p from the unique λ solving the clearing
house’s task. 
It is worth noticing that, when x˙ = 0, Mertens’ algorithm may end up with various
price ratios (see Example 2 supra), while, when µ = 0 and M > 0, the players’ amounts
of borowed money, m˜i ≥ 0 and the price normalization factor λ > 0 may take various
values compatible with
∑
i m˜i = M and λp · x˙+ ≤ m˜i.
Let X(Tz(t)E) denote the unique commodity flow of the monetary tangent market
Tz(t)E , and P (Tz(t)E) the set of associated prices. Our dynamics is defined by the pair
of equations:
x˙(t) = X(Tz(t)E) and p(t) ∈ P (Tz(t)E). (24)
It turns out that the mapping ϕ : z 7→ X(TzE) is not continuous in general. This is,
of course, partly due to the presence of discontinuities arising from the friction r(t).36
33To put it differently, the δi(t) are given by households’ expectations. Therefore, expectations are
responsible for the speed of trades or, equivalently, for the liquidity of markets. But the δi(t) themselves
are bounded by the real stocks xi(t). Thus, it is the stock of commodity in the long-run economy E that
prevents its dynamic state to move at an infinite speed.
34When µ = 0, as already said, we are back either (M > 0) to the idealized barter case, where prices
really are only ratios among pairs of goods, or (M = 0) to no-trade. Consequently, in both cases, price
indeterminacy is intrinsic to the model.
35See section VIII.A.Def. 5 in Mertens (2003).
36There are, however, deeper reasons for this phenomenon, since discontinuity prevails even in the
barter case: Firstly, every strategic market game a` la Shapley-Shubik involves a discontinuous outcome
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Therefore, continuously differentiable curves satisfying (24) do not exist in general, so
that we need to rely on a suitable notion of solution. We shall deal with Filippov’s
concept of solution (see the Appendix, subsection 6.1, as well as Filippov (1988)), which,
in essence, consists in replacing x˙(t) = X(Tz(t)E) by a differential inclusion, where the
derivative x˙(t) is only asked to belong to a set of directions lying in a neighborhood of
X(Tz(t)E). This flexibility is key in providing reasonable conditions on the vector field
of our dynamics for trade curves to exist. One may be bothered by this technical bend,
since differential inclusions hardly provide unique solution curves, while we adopted
Mertens’solution concept precisely with the aim of recovering uniqueness. The piece of
good news provided by the next section is that this trick shall nevertheless yield generic
uniqueness.
4 Uniqueness and non-neutrality
This section contains the main results of this paper.
4.1 Existence
A monetary policy is continuous (resp. smooth, etc.), when the mapping R 3 t 7→Mt
is so. Existence of monetary trade curves holds under fairly general conditions, as shown
by the next theorem. Observe, in particular, that no interiority assumption is made on
the long-run real economy E , nor any Slatter or survival or irreducibility restriction –
all of them would be at odds with the recent experience of financial markets after the
subprime crisis. Similarly, preferences need not be convex.37
Theorem 1.—For every feasible initial state z(0) and for every monetary
policy (M(t))t which continuous for a.e. time t, then (24) admits a solution
curve.
This theorem is somewhat loosely expressed since, so far, we did not spell out the
definition of a “solution” to (24) in order not to interrupt too much the body of our
analysis. Precise details are given in the Appendix, together with the proof of Theorem
1.
4.2 Generic nominal uniqueness of trade curves
Let us endow the space of utilities u = (ui)i with the sup-norm topology (||ui|| =
maxXi ui(x)) and that of continuous monetary policies t 7→ Mt with the topology of
function ; so does every auction as well. Secondy, the Walras correspondence fails to be lower hemi-
continuous in general, hence to admit any continuous selection. So does any generalized equilibrium
correspondence. Hence, whatever being the viewpoint under which ϕ is analyzed – as a Sapley win-
dow’s game with limit-orders or a double auction or a generalized equilibrium concept –, it must be
discontinuous.
37It is even possible to weaken the differentiability assumption on utilities, but we refrain from striving
for the utmost generality.
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uniform convergence over compacta.38 The next result states that, given aggregate
initial endowments in commodities, ω, any initial state of outside money m(0), and for a
dense subclass of utilities u and monetary policies Mt, the vector field associated to our
dynamics is smooth on an open and dense subset of the feasible set, provided µ(t) > 0
throughout. The Cauchy-Lipschitz theory of smooth differential equations then implies
that, when restricted to this generic subset, the Cauchy problem induced by (24) admits
a (piecewise) unique solution path in forward time not only in real but also in nominal
terms. In the sequel, M∗ denotes the subset of feasible states such that µ > 0.
Theorem 2.—Given aggregate initial endowments in commodities, ω >>
0, and in outside money m > 0, and for a dense subclass of utilities u
verifying the standard smoothness restrictions and smooth policies M , the
product space R×M∗ can be partitioned as:
R×M∗ = R∪ C
where C is the finite, disjoint union of smooth submanifolds, all of them of
dimension strictly less than
C(N − 1) +N(C + 2) + 2 = dimR = dimR×M∗.
Moreover, the restriction of (24) to the (open and dense) subset R induces a
smooth vector field.
In fact, the proof of Theorem 2 contains much more than the statement of the theorem
itself says. Rougly speaking, the situation is as follows. First, because expectations
exert a non-trivial influence on both the real and the monetary spheres, the space, M∗,
of allocations in commodities and cash can no more be considered independently of
time. They are intrinsically conjugate. Second, for a generic class of parameters of the
dynamics, there are large regions within the space-time environment R×M∗, where local
gains-to-trade, expectations and money coexist in a sort of balance, leading to a unique
smooth trade path together with a smooth price curve. This balance changes abruptly
when we pass beyond the surface of one such region. At best, the change between an
inner regime and an outer regime may be marked by a lack of differentiability of the
trade and/or the price curve. This is what market makers usually call a “market crunch”
(see Fig. 6).
38That is, the topology over the space of monetary policies M is given by the following family of
semi-norms (for k ∈ N,K ⊂ R compact):
||M ||K := max
K
Mt.
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Fig. 6. Crossing a critical boundary may cause a “market crunch”.
But reaching the frontier, S, between two regimes, say D1 and D2, may cause a more
profond change than simply a “kink” in the trade-and-price curve: if it reaches tangen-
tially the boundary, the curve may quit it (or not) in different directions (see Fig. 7). If
it does enter into the new regime, then one nano-second later, of course, a new balance
between our three forces will have been recovered, so that the trade-and-price curve will
again evolve smoothly in an unambiguous way. But at the very moment we touch a
“critical” frontier, various things can happen that cannot be predicted from the past
observed in the previous regime.
Notice that this phenomenon already obtains for a barter and myopic economy:39
What considerably simplifies the picture in this latter case, however, is that time and
space can again be considered separately, while the monetary sector disappears. As
a consequence, only the feasible set, τ , of commodity allocationsthe need to be parti-
tionned between “regular” regions and “critical” boundaries. In Example 1 supra (see
section 2.1), for instance, there are two regimes, separated by the diagonal, θ, of effi-
cient allocations. For more general economies, generically, there are always finitely many
smooth submanifolds playing the role of critical boundaries.
Whether crossing a critical boundary will have no visible effect, or will simply cause
a crunch or will result in some momentarily unpredictable behavior can be easily checked
in the barter-myopic case. Indeed, according to Filippov’s theory of discontinuous vector
fields, one simply need consider the following possibilities (see Fig. 7):
(a) if the vector field arising from the inner regime points in the direction of the outer
regime, where the vector field flows away from the critical submanifold S, then the trade
path continues its motion in the outer regime (possibly with some kink);
(b) if both the vector field of the inner regime D1 and that of the outer regime D2
flow into S, then after having reached S, the solution curve will stay in S and possibly
slide along the boundary of the two regimes. The latter kind of trajectory is called a
sliding motion. Notice that forward uniqueness is still preserved in this case. Notice as
well that, whenever the two vector fields arising from D1 and D2 are exactly opposite (in
the sense that x˙+ + x˙− = 0 where x˙+ is the limit of x˙(t) as x(t) reaches S from D1, and
x˙−(t) the same limit for x(t) reaching S from D2), then they cancel each other at S: the
39See Giraud (2004).
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point x∗ at which x(t) reaches S from both sides is a rest-point. In this case, the motion
does not slide along S. This is exactly what occurs along the critical submanifolds whose
union builds Θ.
Finally, (c) if the vector field arising from D1 is tangent to S while the vector field
in D2 flows away from S, then either the path leaves the boundary immediately in order
to enter into D2, or there exist (Filippov) solutions that reach the boundary and stay in
it afterwards, for a time that cannot be deduced from the inner regime. In this latter
case (only), forward uniqueness is lost.
S
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(a)
→
→
→ →
→
→→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→→
S
(b)
D1
D2
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→ →
→
→→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→
→→
S
D1
D2
→
→→
→
→
→→
→
→
→
→
→
→→
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(c)
Fig. 7.The dynamical systems are smooth on D1 and D2, and disctontinuous at S.
Adding the monetary field while keeping the myopia restriction does not tremendously
alter this relatively simple picture: it only enlarges the space, τ , of commodity allocations
into the space τ × RN of commodity and monetary allocations. Adding expectations
drastically modifies the situation. It enlarges again the space under scrutiny intoM∗ by
taking into account the households’ saving behavior. On the other hand, the boundary
between two regimes may, now, be in time and not solely in space. One regime may
represent the dynamical state of the world up to a given time and the other regime the
state after that time. When the change of regime occurs solely “in time”, then we can
be sure that it is entirely due to a shock in expectations. Otherwise, of course, the
situation is more complicated. What Theorem 2 says, in essence, is this: expectations,
real gains-to-trade and money will interact with each other in creating in the space-time
environment R × M∗ a finite number of smooth manifolds that will play the role of
critical boundaries.
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4.2.1 How “rational” are locally rational expectations ?
We already know from Lemma 1 that, together with the individual maximization of
short-run utility, locally rational expectations imply that the no-default condition be
satisfied as an equality (16), i.e., that no household ever goes bankrupt: p · x˙i = 0 a.e. i.
As a by-product of Theorem 2, we can add a second feature formalizing the sense in which
expectations in this paper are “locally rational”. Indeed, the piecewise smoothness of
trade curves enables us to state the following version of gross-substitutability in tangent
markets:40
Proposition 3.— Under the standard smoothness restrictions, and for ev-
ery regular state z(t) ∈ R such that δi(t) >> 0 for every i, one has:
∂
∂δci (t)
P (Tz(t)E) ≤ 0 for every commodity c. (25)
Suppose that trader i anticipates the price of commodity c to increase in the
near future. If he is positively endowed with good c, he should save some additional
amout of this very commodity in order to sell it latter on. Hence, δci (t) should decrease.
Proposition 3 says that, consequently, the current price pc(t) will rise (or, at least, will not
decline) if everything else is being kept fixed. Conversely, if i expects pc(t) to decrease,
hence decides to sell more of commodity c on the tangent market Tz(t)E, then pc(t) will
decrease. Hence, i’s expectations turn out to be always self-fulfilled in the short-run
along a trade curve. Notice, of course, that consumers i and j may have contradictory
expectations over the same commodity c at the same time t. In this case, only the trader
whose saving behavior was most influential on the resulting price will see his viewpoint
confirmed by the market.
4.3 Stability and money non-neutrality
We now address two questions that turn out to be intimately related: How stable are
stationary points of our dynamics ? and: Is money neutral in our model ? It is clear
that, if both m and M are multiplied by some constant λ > 0, then nothing changes
in the analysis. This means that there is no money illusion. However, if m and M are
changed disproportionately, then there will typically be a change in the long-run real
variables characterizing the monetary trade curves of the economy. We show in this
subsection how to characterize the short-run and long-run impact of such a monetary
change on the real sector. Unless otherwise specified, we assume hereafter that m > 0.
40One could drop the regularity restriction on the state z(t) at the cost of replacing the differential
operator by Clarke’s generalized gradient, as in Bonnisseau et alii (2001). We do not stop for details.
26
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.61
4.3.1 Local gains-to-trade
We now formally define the measure γ(x) of local gains-to-trade first alluded to in
section 2.1 above.
Let z˙i ∈ RC be an infinitesimal trade vector of i in some tangent market, with positive
component representing purchases and negative ones representing sales. For any scalar
γ ≥ 0, define:
z˙ci (γ) := min
{
z˙ci ,
z˙ci
1 + γ
}
. (26)
The vector z˙i(γ) entails a diminution of purchases in z˙i by the fraction 1/(1 + γ). There
are local gains to γ-diminished trades in the barter tangent market TδE if there exist
feasible infinitesimal trades (z˙i)i such that z˙i ≥ δi for all i, and vi(z˙i(γ)) ≥ 0 for all
i with at least one strict inequality. In words, it should be possible for households to
Pareto-improve on no-trade in spite of the γ-handicap on trades. For every x ∈ τ,
the measure γ(x) is the supremum of all handicaps that permit Pareto-improvement.
Clearly, x is Pareto-optimal if, and only if, γ(x) = 0. An important property of the
measure γ(·) is that it is invariant with respect to rescaling the units of commodities.41
The monetary version of γ(·) goes as follows: (i) If µ > 0, then consider the linear
economy obtained by ignoring, in TzE , those traders i with µi = 0. Denote by γ∗(δ)
the measure applied on the short-sale constraints of those traders who are positively
endowed with money. Local gains-to-trade are then defined as: γ(z) := γ∗(δ). (ii) If
µ = 0, then γ(z) := γ(δ).
The next Proposition is the key result for Theorem 3 to follow, but is also interesting
in its own right.
Proposition 4.—(i) Suppose that, for every i, whenever defined, ∇ui(x) >
> 0. For every feasible z, if the monetary flow of TzE verifies x˙ = 0, then
one of the following must be true:
(a) Either γ(z) = 0,
(b) or r > γ(z),
(c) else, δ = 0.
(ii) If r > γ(z), the unique monetary flow is no-trade.
Proposition 4 (i) tells us under which conditions no trade will occur on a tangent
market. Three situations may be identified: Either (a) investors do not believe that there
are gains to trade –that is, the current allocation of commodities put on the market as
a result of people’s expectations is already Pareto-optimal. Or (b) the cost of borrowing
41This follows, e.g., from Theorem 1 in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a). As a consequence, γ(x) is not
affected by the procedure applied by our clearing house in order to fix trades and prices.
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inside money is too heavy in both countries k = 1, 2in comparison with current gains-to-
trade as envisaged by people –i.e., the cash-in-advance constraint prevents from trading
people who, otherwise, would be willing to do so. Else (c), investors are so pessimistic
that they refuse to trade and save all their commodities. Proposition 4 (ii) provides a
partial converse: If the current interest rate is above the threshold provided by current
gains-to-trade (given households’ savings) in both countries, then no-trade must occur.
4.3.2 Asymptotic local efficiency
A feasible commodity allocation x ∈ τ is locally Pareto-optimal if there does not exist
any C1 path φ : [a, b)→ τ of monetary trades such that φ(a) = x and ∇ui(xi) · φ˙(x) ≥ 0
for every i, with at least one strict inequality. Let us denote by θ the set of such
allocations. Clearly, x ∈ θ if, and only if, 0 is Pareto-optimal in Tx,δ,µ,m,ME , whatever
being the variables (δ, µ,m,M). On the other hand, it suffices that utilities be weakly
quasi-concave (at least on a neighborhood of θ) for every locally optimal allocation to
be globally efficient. For any scalar γ > 0, let us also denote by θγ the set of allocations
x ∈ θ for which there are no local gains to γ-diminished trades.
In what follows, given some trajectory ϕ(·) inM×R, we may consider its restriction,
x(·), over τ – which we call a trade curve. A point x ∈ τ is said to be stationary whenever
the constant mapping ≡ x is a (degenerate) trade curve of the dynamics. A feasible
allocation x is a limit-point of a curve x(·) : [a, b) → τ if there exists a sequence (tn)n
tending to +∞ such that x(tn) → x. Let Ω(x(·)) denote the subset of limit-points of
x(·). A point x ∈ τ is locally stable if every solution curve that does not start too far
away from x remains in a neighborhood of it.
We are now ready to state the central result of this paper.
Theorem 3.—Under the standard smoothness assumptions and for every
feasible initial state z(0) >> 0,
(i) Suppose that the two following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Expectations are such that, for every i, xci (t) > 0⇒ δci (t) > 0
for every c, and almost every t;
(b) t 7→M(t) grows sufficiently rapidly, so that:
M(t) ≥ µ(t)
γ(z(t))
, a.e. t, (27)
then every trade curve converges to some point x∗ ∈ θ.
(ii) On the contrary, if the length of time where markets are not sufficiently
liquid verifies42
42Here, λ(·) is the Lebesgue measure.
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λ
[{
t : γ(z(t)) <
µ(t)
M(t)
= r(t)
}
∩ {t : µ(t) > 0}] > 0, (28)
then, at some time t∗, the flow of Tz(t∗)E coincides with no-trade whatever
being the investors’ expectations, and the state will rest on x(t∗) as long as the
ratio of inside money to outside available cash does not increase sufficiently
so as to verify (27) for a subset of time t ≥ t∗ of positive measure.
(iii) Every locally optimal allocation x ∈ θ is a locally stable stationary point.
(iv) Consider two monetary policies M1(·) and M2(·) applied on the same
economy E, such that, on the time interval [ta, tb], traders entertain the same
expectations (i.e., the restrictions of µi(·), σi(·) to [ta, tb] are a.e. identical
for every i), and such that
γ(z(t)) >
µ(t)
Mk(t)
= rk(t), k = 1, 2 (29)
for a.e. t in [ta, tb]. Then, the trade curves xk(·) followed in τ during this
time interval [ta, tb] are identical. Only prices p(·) depend upon the chosen
monetary policy.
A couple of remarks are in order.
1) That a condition akin to (27) is necessary for escaping from any liquidity trap
should be made clear by the following example. Consider the two-good real economy
E := (u1, u2, ω1, ω2) with u1(x) = x1, u2(x) = x2, ω1 = (1, 2), ω2 = (3, 3). Obviously
there are still gains-to-trade at ω (i.e., γ(ω) > 0). Suppose, however, that expectations
are such that δ1(0) = (1, 0) and δ2(0) = (2, 3). The tangent market Tz(0)E reduces to
the linear economy of Fig. 4 above. Hence, whatever being the amount of inside money
injected, the economy remains trapped at ω.
Conversely, in (29), γ(z(t)) < r(t) will open a liquidity trap only whenever, at the
same time, µ(t) > 0. Otherwise, we know indeed that the monetary flow degenerates to
some Walras equilibrium which becomes independent from the monetary sector.
2) (iii) states that each locally Pareto-optimal allocation in voluntary trades is locally
stable. Given the local shape of θ (a smooth submanifold of dimension C − 1 whenever
E fulfills the standard smoothness restrictions), it is impossible to improve this property
to local asymptotic stability: the later would require that every curve x(·) starting not
too far avay from x should converge to it. But this is impossible if x(·) starts at x(0) ∈ θ
near x. This drawback (lack of asymptotic stability) is not peculiar to the our dynamics,
but inherent to every non-taˆtonnement approach.
3) Most textbooks devoted to monetary theories with rational expectations conclude
that money is non-neutral in the short-run, but neutral in the long-run. Here, we do not
get this conclusion for the following reason: in the short-run, if γ(x) 6= r, a sufficiently
small change in r will not affect the direction in which the state of the economy moves.
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Indeed, either γ(x) < r, in which case there is no trade (part (ii) of Theorem 3); or
γ(x) > r, in which case the long-run economy moves in the same direction, whatever
being the monetary policy (part (iii)). In this narrow sense, money can be said to be
locally neutral in the short-run — “locally” because the preceding argument holds only
for “small” changes in the monetary variables r and M . Observe, nevertheless, that if
γ(x) = r (a non-generic event), then the slightest change of r will have a real effect, even
in the short-run.
4) Now, in the long-run, different amounts of inside or outside money will induce
different trade curves in real terms. Indeed, if r is fixed, then the trajectory followed
by the long-run economy will stop at some point x ∈ τ where γ(x) = r. If r 6= r′, then
x 6= x′. As a consequence, money is non-neutral in the long-run.
5) In the literature just alluded to, one often asks whether money is super-neutral,
meaning that a change in the growth of the level of money would not affect real variables.
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that money is not super-neutral in our
model since there is a minimal rate of growth for inside money, below which the economy
remains traped in a liquidity trap before having reached an optimum.
6) Observe that, in most of the literature derived from Lucas (1972), information
is asymmetric, and it is an unanticipated change in the money level that makes money
non-neutral. On the other hand, in such models, there is usually no outside money. As
a consequence, when information becomes symmetric, money non-neutrality reduces to
money illusion in this approach. By contrast, here as in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a),
the presence of both outside and inside money enables to combine no money illusion (the
whole dynamics is 0-homogeneous with respect to (m,M)) with money non-neutrality).
7) The sense in which (27) yields an optimal growth rate of inside money is provided
by (iii). Indeed, the later says that, as long as (29) holds, a further increase of M(·)
will have no real effect. According to our local quantity theory of money (20), it must
therefore induce inflation. We shall see this phenomenon at work through the next
example.
4.4 An example
Before plunging into an example, let us make a simple observation.43
Lemma 3.— Taken together, the cash-in-advance constraint, p(t) · x+i (t) ≤
m˜i(t) + µi(t), and the no-default condition conveniently rewritten as:
(1 + r(t))m˜(t) ≤ p(t) · x˙−i (t) +
[
µi(t) + m˜i(t)− p(t) · x+i (t)
]+
are equivalent with the following non-linear budget constraint:
〈p(t), x˙〉r(t) := p(t) · x+i (t)−
1
1 + r(t)
p(t) · x−i (t) ≤ µi(t). (30)
43This is a reformulation of Lemma 1 in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2006a).
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Proof of Lemma 3. Take any infinitesimal trade x˙i(t) verifying (30) and set m˜i(t) :=[
p(t) · x˙+i (t)−µi(t)
]+
. Then the cash-in-advance constraint is easily checked, while m˜i(t)
is either zero or fulfills:
m˜i(t) = p(t) · x˙+i (t)−
1
1 + r(t)
p(t) · x˙−i (t)− µi(t) +
1
1 + r(t)
p(t) · x˙−i (t)
≤ 1
1 + r(t)
p(t) · x˙−i (t) because of (30),
so that the no-default condition is satisfied as well. Conversely, suppose that x˙i(t) verifies
the two above mentioned constraints. Then,
−1
1 + r(t)
p(t) · x˙−i (t) ≤
1
1 + r(t)
(
µi(t)− p(t) · x˙i(t)− r(t)m˜i(t)
)
.
Hence:
〈p(t), x˙i(t)〉r(t) ≤
r(t)
1 + r(t)
p(t) · x˙+i (t) +
1
1 + r(t)
µi(t)− r(t)
1 + r(t)
m˜i(t)
≤ µi(t) because of the cash-in-advance constraint.

This observation provides us with an alternate characterization of monetary pseudo-
flows in case µ(t) > 0. The optimization programme of player i in TzE consists indeed
in maximizing his short-run utility vi under the budget constraint (30) induced by the
non-linear pricing rule 〈·, ·〉r(t). Whenever r(t) = 0, this reduces to the standard inner
product.
Suppose, now, there are two agents and two commodities (N = C = 2).44 Short-
sale constraints at time t are given by δ1(t) = δ2(t) = (50, 50); private outside cash
available for trade is µ1(t) = µ2(t) = C 5; inside money is M(t) = C 90. Finally, short-
run marginal utilities are v1(x˙11, x˙
1
2) =
10
75 x˙
1
1 +
3
25 x˙
1
2, and v
2(x˙21, x˙
2
2) =
3
25 x˙
2
1 +
10
75 x˙
2
2. At the
unique monetary flow, prices are p1(t) = p2(t) = 1; interest rate is r(t) =
1
9 ; infinitesimal
trades verify x˙1(t) = (50,−50), x˙2(t) = (−50, 50). Household 1 goes short in commodity
2 and buys 1. For this purpose, it spends his C 5 and buys 5 units of good 1. It also
borrows m˜1(t) = C 45 from the Bank, promising to repay (1 + r(t))m˜1(t) = C 50. This
loan is spent to buy 45 additional units of good 1. Finally, agent 1 sells 50 units of good
2 to agent 2, and is able to repay the Bank. Traders’ final gradients are not parallel,
because:
∂v1
∂x11
(x˙1(t))
p1(t)
= (1 + r(t))
∂v1
∂x12
(x˙1(t))
p2(t)
and
∂v2
∂x22
(x˙2(t))
p2(t)
= (1 + r(t))
∂v2
∂x21
(x˙2(t))
p1(t)
.
44In order to facilitate comparisons, we adopt a linearized version of Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a)’s
example (see their section 6).
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This misalignment is clearly due to the transaction cost r(t), and confirms that a flow
may fail to be Pareto-optimal in the tangent market.45
In order to understand how the clearing-house works according to our second rectric-
tion, observe that a continuum of alternate pseudo-flows would have been conceivable.
For instance, p1(t) = p2(t) = 2; r(t) =
1
9 (unchanged), and x˙
1(t) = (25,−25), x˙2(t) =
(−25, 25) is a pseudo-flow of the tangent market (see Fig. 8).
q
−δ1
0
q
x˙
Budget of 1
Budget of 2
q
qµ1
p2
+
p1x
1
1
p2(1+r) ∇u1(x1) · z˙ =cst.
µ1
p1
Fig. 8. An interior pseudo-flow
In Fig. 8 above, the red segments figure the frontier of player 1’s budget set. (we
have dropped the time index in order to shorten notations.) Similarly, every point in the
segment joining the origin (no-trade) to the unique monetary flow (bottom-right corner)
can be turned into a pseudo-flow by choosing the appropriate price level. Obviously,
however, only the bottom-right corner does maximize the volume of infinitesimal trades.
Not surprisingly, it also minimizes the price level.
What happens, now, if, everything else being kept fixed, M(t) decreases ? Then
r(t) increases above γ(z(t)) = 19 , and the unique flow is no-trade (Proposition 4 (ii)).
On the contrary, when M(t) increases, r(t) decreases below γ(z(t)). Clearly, real trades
cannot change. How do prices evolve as M(t) increases ? For a given r(t) < 19 , one gets:
p1(t) = p2(t) =
1+r(t)
10r(t) . Therefore, as soon as M(t) > γ(z(t))/µ(t), then the “classical
dichotomy” holds in the short-run: an increase of inside money just increases prices
proportionally at time t and decreases the interest rate without affecting real trades
(and even without affecting the speed of trades). Thus, above a certain finite threshold,
45Observe that a monetary flow need not be Pareto-optimal within the tangent market even when
r = 0, as shown by Example 2 above, where no-trade is the unique flow although it is not efficient. Of
course, when r = 0, µi > 0, δi >> 0 and ∇ui(xi) >> 0 for every i, every flow is a first-order flow which
is Pareto-optimal with respect to short-run utilities.
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an increase of inside money has no impact but nominal inflation.
Suppose, now, that M(t) is fixed. What happens as µ(t) varies due, say, to some
change in households’expectations or to some fiscal policy ? For simplicity, let’s re-
strict ourselves to proportional variations of cash for each household. Whenever µ(t) >
M(t)γ(z(t)), no-trade is the unique flow and prices are indeterminate. If µ(t) = M(t)γ(z(t)),
the state of the long-run economy is driven by the unique monetary flow of its tangent
market. When µ(t) further decreases, the economy moves in the same direction and at
the same spped, but r(t) decreases and prices decrease as well.
One can summarize the short-run effects of (i) monetary policy (M(t) varies) and
(ii) non-discriminatory fiscal policy (µi(t) varies proportionally for each household i) by
means of the following two diagrams:
Price level
M(t)
Price indeterminacy
and collapse of trade
µ(t)
γ(z(t))
r1
Nominal inflation
no real impact
Fig. 9. Outside cash, µ(t), fixed; M(t) varies.
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Price level
µ(t)
Price indeterminacy
and collapse of trade
γ(z(t))M(t)
r
Nominal inflation
no real impact
1
1
10
Fig. 10. Inside money, M(t), fixed; µ(t) varies.
When compared with Fig. 6 in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a), here, there is no “hyperin-
flation phenomenon” due to purely monetary factors: As M(t) decreases to µ(t)/γ(z(t))
(µ(t) being fixed), both prices converge to 1. At the moment where M(t) < µ(t)/γ(z(t)),
prices are indeterminate. Similarly, when M(t) is fixed, as µ(t) increases towards
γ(z(t))M(t), prices converge towards (1, 1) and then are indeterminate. Of course, the
linear tangent market of this example can be approximated by a strictly concave one by
replacing each linear short-run preference vi by vi + ε
∑
c
√
xic. One then sees that our
diagrams are degenerate limits of Fig. 6 and 7 of Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a).
Our analysis, however, has the feature that, whenever all households’ expectations
are so pessimistic that δi(t) decrease, then prices rise. Indeed, suppose, to simplify the
picture, that both households in the preceding example share “isomorphic” expectations,
so that δ1(t) = δ2(t) → 0+. Then, the Edgeworth box will reduce to its central point:
the speed of trades declines to zero, while the price level rises much faster than linearly
since it reaches infinity over a finite move of δi(t). This explosion of price can be called
hyperinflation. Thus, in this model, hyperinflation occurs only when households lose so
much confidence in money that they even don’t want to sell commodities for money any
more. And in such a case, the monetary policy is irrelevant in order to prevent such a
phenomenon!
Going back to the doctrinal debate already alluded to, our analysis conjugates Fried-
man’s remodeling of the qtm into a theory of the demand for money together with the
Keynesian money non-neutrality. Arguing that prices would fall in a depression, thereby
raising the purchasing power of wealth held in unspent money, many monetarists claim
indeed that the price-induced rise in the real value of cash balances would then stim-
ulate spending directly. It follows that a rise in the real balances and hence spending
could be accomplished just as easily via a monetary expansion, validating the potency
of monetary policy even in a depression. Here, this argument holds partially, provided
households’ expectations do not affect their willingness to sell commodities (i.e., δi(t)).
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But even then, it holds only partially since, if an economy is located in a liquidity trap,
a rise in the quantity of money M(·) (due to monetary policy) or in mi(t) (due to fiscal
policy) does not have any effect as long as (27) does not hold (in particular, as long as it
does not influence µi(t) positively). Nevertheless, both policies may be operative if they
succeed in enforcing (27) for a time interval of positive length.
Looking now at the dynamic picture, one sees that the trade curve followed by our
long-run economy depends upon the quantity of circulating money in the following way:
(α) either µ(t) >> 0 (that is, traders’ expectations are not too pessimistic) and
there is enough inside money throughout, in which case the economy follows a unique
trade curve γ (which coincides, here, with the non-monetary “Walrasian” trade curve);
in particular, it converges to some Pareto-optimal point, r(t) → 0+ and prices remain
bounded ;
(β) or there is not enough inside money, i.e., 0 < M(t) < µ(t)γ(z(t)) during a non-
negligible interval of time [ta, tb]. In this case, the economy stops at x(ta) (even though
x(ta) /∈ θ), with r(ta) > 0;
(γ) or there is not enough outside money. For instance, one of the two traders i
become so pessimistic that µi(t) = 0 (while µj(t) > 0) during a non-negligible interval
of time [ta, tb]. Then, again, the economy stops at x(ta), whatever being the amount of
outside money M(ta) injected in the system (player j has no counterpart with whom
she could trade).
(δ) or there are not sufficiently many commodities offered for sale, i.e., δi(t) → 0+
for at least one of the two households.
5 A double-auction with limit-price orders
As we have just seen, our dynamics results in a line γ(·) inM×R (possibly degenerate
at some point whenever the economy remains bloked in a liquidity trap). Imagine, now,
an electron microscope aimed at a point z ∈M. Under enlargement, the neighborhood
of z and the environment above it become linear: we get the tangent market TzE . With
even greater magnification, we see, instead of the reduced-form model summed up in
section 2.3, a strategic market-game G[TzE ], where investors send limit-price orders in
continuous time to a central clearing house which instantaneously execute some of them
according to some rules that we describe now.46 From the standpoint of the central
clearing house, investors are “invisible”: all it can see is the order book populated by a
myriad of anonymous orders.
Recall that each agent i actually stands for a continuum, [0, 1], of identical clones,
having the same utility, ui(·), the same initial endowment, ωi, and the same saving
46In essence, we adapt Merten’s (2003) limit price mechanism to Dubey & Geanakolos (2003) monetary
setting. The stragegic mechanism can be viewed alternatively as the multi-item extension of double
auction, or as the extension of Shapley’s windows model (see Sahi & Yao (1989)) to limit-price orders.
See Giraud (2003) for an introduction.
35
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.61
functions si(·), σi(·), so that the space of players is [0, 1]N equipped with the product
Lebesgue measure λ⊗N|[0,1] =: ν.
5.1 The barter case once again
For simplicity, let’s begin with a two-good barter economy.
Strategies as fictitious agents
A strategy of player i in the local game G[TzE ] associated to the tangent market TzE
is to send a limit-price order to the market. Only selling orders are allowed — but this
implies no loss of generality: if a player wants to buy a commodity, he just has to sell
money. A limit-order to sell item commodity ` in exchange for item c gives a quantity
q` to be sold, and a relative price p
+
` /p
+
c . The order is to sell up to q`c units of item `
in exchange for item c if the actual relative price verifies p`/pc ≥ p+` /p+c . The amount
q` put up for sale will stay untouched at any price p` < pcp
+
` /p
+
c , and is intended to be
fully sold at any price p` ≥ pcp+` /p+c . When
p+`
p+c
= 0, one gets a familiar market order.
A limit-order to “sell” commodity ` against c, at relative prices p+c = 0, p
+
` > 0 is, in
fact, an order not to buy c, and to sell as much of ` as possible. We now recall Mertens’
trick.The key in understanding the relationship between the reduced-form model and
G[TzE ] lies in Mertens’ trick.
Mertens’ trick. Suppose that the central clearing house fixes p as a current price
vector. Checking whether a sell-order (q`, p
+
` /p
+
c ) must be (totally or, at least, partially)
executed at p, is equivalent to solving the following programme (see Fig. 10):
max
{p+`
p+c
x˙ | p · x˙ ≤ 0 and x˙ ≥ (0, ...,−q`, ...0)
}
. (31)
q0
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
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@
@
@
@
@
@
@
Fig. 11. Limit-price orders are fictitious linear agents.
−qi
→--
(p+` , p
+
c )
`
c
q
x˙∗i →-- p
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Here, indeed, the relative price pc/p` (set by the market) is lower than the limit-price
p+c /p
+
` , so that the order to sell ` against c is entirely executed: The agent who sent
this order will sell the quantity q`i of good ` against (p`/pc)q
`
i units of commodity c, and
will end up at x˙∗i . But x˙
∗
i coincides with the Walrasian demand of the fictitious agent
with linear utility vi(x˙) := (p
+
c /p
+
` )x˙ and short-sale bound δi := qi. In other words, a
limit-price order can be viewed as a fictitious linear “agent”, whose (non-normalized)
“utility” is given by the relative price (or “exchange rate”, or “personal price” at which
the sender of the order agrees to exchange one good for another) p+` /p
+
c , and whose
“short-sale bound” is the offer (0, ..., q`, ..., 0).
More generally, in a C-commodity barter tangent market, an order is a vector of
relative prices bi := (p+1 , ..., p
+
C) and a vector of offers e
i := (q1, ..., qC), to be understood
as follows: If the actual relative price of good c against good ` verifies:
pc
p`
≥ p
+
c
p+`
,
then player i is ready to sell up to quantity q` of commodity ` against c. There is no loss
of generality in restricting ourselves to sell-orders since a buying order, say of commodity
`, can be replicated as an order to sell any other commodity against `. For simplicity,
we assume that, within a single period t, a player i can send a single order (bi, ei) to the
market. This also involves no loss, since this player’s short-run utility is linear in TzE ,
so that his demand and supply correspondence can be mimicked by means of a single
limit-order.47 The following examples may be helpful.
Examples. (i) If C > 2, and ei = (0, ..., 1, ..., 0) (1 stands in the cth position),
bi = (p+1 , 0, ..., 0, p
+
c , 0, ..., 0) is a limit sell order of one unit of good c in
exchange for commodity 1, with limit price p
+
c
p+1
.
(ii) With ei as before, bi = (p+1 , p
+
2 , 0, ..., 0), where ` /∈ {1, 2}, is a market
order to sell e`1 in exchange for either good 1 or 2, according to which one
will yield the most value in terms of the personal relative price (i.e., “marginal
utility”) system (p+1 , p
+
2 ).
Order books as linear economies
The collection of strategies played by households at time t is a strategy profile, or
equivalently, an order book. In the same vein as a single order is but a linear fictitious
“agent”, an order book can be seen as a fictitious linear “economy”, L, defined as follows:

(
[0, 1]N , λ⊗N|[0,1]
)
is the space of “agents”;
 For each fictitious “agent” i (i.e., for each order), his linear “utility” is
given by bi := (p+c )c ;
 His “short-sale bound” is defined as ei := (qc)c.
47By contrast, in a non-linear economy, to mimick the demand and supply correspondences of a player
would require a continuum of limit-orders.
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Consider again the economy of Fig. 4 supra. Suppose that this two-agent linear economy
is actually an order book involving for limit-price orders (one for each commodity and
each fictitious agent). The unique pseudo-flow of the order book corresponding to this
fictitious economy involves no-trade, whereas every point on the top horizontal segment
{x ∈ τ : x22 = 0} is Pareto-optimal. Indeed, despite the presence of positive local gains-
to-trade, no-trade is the unique conceivable issue because the order corresponding to
“agent” 1, having no counterpart, cannot be executed (even partially). Indeed, as in any
“real” market, for an order to be executed, there must be some counterpart present on
the market, and here there is none because ”agent” 2 actually refuses to sell commodity
1 in exchange for 2.
We shall make the standard assumption that every stragtegy profile induces a mea-
surable map from the space of players into that of strategies.48 This is true, in particular,
if we focus on symmetric stragtegy profiles where identical players play identical strate-
gies. From now on, order books are therefore linear economies L = (b, e) defined by
measurable functions b, e : [0, 1]N → RL+, e verifying: ei ≤ δi a.e. i.
Back to our dynamics, for simplicity, we impose that an order immediately disappears
once it has been sent at time t, whether it could be executed or not. This is innocuous
since, whenever the corresponding player still wants to send the same order at time t+dt,
he simply has to re-send it.49 Given an order book L = (b, e), the set of flows induced by
this strategy profile is defined as: ϕ(b, e) := (P (b, e), X(b, e)). That is, the flows induced
by a strategy profile in the local game are computed by applying the definition of a flow
not directly to the tangent economy TzE , but to the auxiliary linear economy L, obtained
by interpreting limit-orders as fictitious agents.50 Since the payoff of a player i in the
local game G[TzE ] depends only upon his (infinitesimal) allocation x˙i, and not upon
prices, the indeterminacy of prices is not detrimental to the definition of the strategic
flow function f . The key observation is that, in a perfectly competitive environment
where each player is negligible with respect to others, hence cannot influence prices, no
player has any incentive to manipulate his true short-run characteristics (vi, δi). This
turns out to hold in the more general set-up with money, to which we now turn.
5.2 The monetary local game
Given some stragegy profile at time t, the following happens:
1) At time tα : the quantity, m˜
i(t) ≤M(t), of Euros is borrowed by player i at tα.
48See Dubey & Shapley (1994) on this topic.
49In other words, inexecuted orders are not stored in some order book. This restriction enables to
get rid of practical (and strategic) problems related to the time-to-execution of orders that are not
immediately executed. Indeed, it is shown in Lo et al. [2002] that execution-time is very sensitive to
the limit-price, so that in markets where orders are stored, submitting a limit-order implies a trade-off
between the advantage of obtaining a fixed-price (by contrast with market orders) and the disadvantage
of an unknown order execution time.
50Lemma 4 below will prove, however, that in our perfectly competitive set-up the two linear economies
are the same in L1).
38
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.61
2) At time tβ, each player sends a message to the central clearing house, consisting
of
– p+i(t) := (p+i1 (t), ..., p
+i
C (t)):=limit-price at which i is ready to sell his
offer. (In order to allow comparisons, we require each such limit-price to be
normalized in the unit sphere, i.e., |p+i(t)|= 1.)
– qi(t) := (qi1(t), ..., q
i
C(t), q
i
m(t)):=quantity of commodities sent by i against
cash, with qi(t) ≤ δi(t);
– m˜i(t) + µi(t):=quantity of money spent by i, with µi(t) ≤ mi(t).
The clearing house interprets the received order book as a linear economy
L(t) = (b(t), e(t)) with C commodities and performs trades according to
Mertens’algorithm, calculating prices according to our two restrictions.
3) At time tγ , each player i repays m˜i(t)(1 + r(t)) to the Bank, with r(t) given by
(14).
The key observation is then given by the next result, whose easy proof is left to the
reader – recall, indeed, that, every player being negligible, his strategy cannot affect
macro-variables such as prices; hence everything goes as if everybody would take prices
as given).51
Lemma 4.— In any tangent market Tz(t)E, “truth-telling”, i.e.,
bi(t) = λ(t)∇ui(xi(t)) for some λ(t) > 0 and ei(t) = δi(t) a.e. i,
is a dominant-strategy equilibrium in G[Tz(t)E ].
6 Concluding remarks
We end with a few final remarks.
a) Although outside money plays a crucial roˆle in our model, its presence remains
questionable from an economic point of view. In subsequent work, we plan to explore the
impact of allowing for a certain amount of default along trade curves, taking inspiration
from Tsomocos (2003). Default, indeed, is known to be able to play a roˆle analogous to
outside money in the analysis of money in a general equilibrium setting – cf. Espinosa,
Goodhart & Tsomocos (2009). The idea would be to see whether inside money and
51The picture would be completely different in the presence of finitely many players. Then, of course,
the aggregate order book, L, resulting from, say, a Nash equilibrium, could be quite different from the
underlying marginal economy TzE . See Weyers [2003] for a first study of the strategic market game
associated to the limit-price mechanism in the imperfectly competitive case.
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default (without outside money) would induce the same kind of results as in this paper
or would capture different economic properties.52 On the other hand, allowing for default
will enable us to further weaken the concept of “locally rational” expectations – which,
as already mentioned, imply p · x˙i = 0, for every household i, in this paper. Finally, it
will open the door for a dynamic study of the systemic risk of collective crashes.
b) Everyday experience on the interbank market suggests that (at least in Europe)
this is a rather highly imperfectly competitive market, where a few “big” atomic players
interact strategically. Thus, this first study calls for a parallel analysis within an im-
perfectly competitive framework. This implies studying Mertens’ limit-price mechanism
with finitely many players. A first step in this direction has been made by Weyers (2003).
We also plan to consider the Central Bank itself as a player in order to study within the
present framework the most debated issue of its credibility.
c) A quantitative analysis of the long-run impact of money will be performed latler
on, taking advantage of the generic global nominal uniqueness of trade curves in our
dynamics, and of the fact that this dynamics is numerically computable (as can be
deduced from the proof of Theorem 2, see the Appendix).
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7 Appendix
This section contains mathematical proofs of results not proven in the main text.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we need to recall Filippov’s solution for differential
equations with a discontinuous right-hand side. Let
x˙(t) = f(x(t)), (32)
where f : Rm ⊂→ Rm is a possibly discontinuous vector field.
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Definition. A Filippov solution of (32), is an absolutely continuous trajec-
tory φ : [a, b)→ Rm such that, for a.e. t ∈ [a, b),
φ˙(t) ∈ Gf (φ(t)) := ∩ε>0 ∩A∈N co
{
y | d(y, f(φ(t)))) < ε, y /∈ A}. (33)
where N := family of sets A ⊂ Rm of (Lebesgue) measure zero.
In words, a path φ is a solution of (32) if it is absolutely continuous and if, for almost
all t ∈ [a, b), and for arbitrary ε > 0, the vector ddtφ(t) belongs to the smallest convex
closed set containing all the values of the sets f(y), when y ranges over almost all of the
ε-neighborhoods of x, i.e., the entire neighborhood except possibly for a set of Lebesgue
measure zero.
Proof of Theorem 1.
In order to apply Filippov’s theory, we need to slightly perturb the dynamics defined
by (24). Indeed, as we know from the remark just after Lemma 2 that, for x˙(t) = 0,
P (Tz(t)E) does not reduce to a singleton. Thus, for all rest-points of the dynamics, we can
replace P (Tz(t)E) by an arbitrary selection pz(t) ∈ P (Tz(t)E). Similarly, for every t such
that µ(t) = 0 and M(t) > 0, we know that the resulting pseudo-flow is indeterminate
because it is an “optimal allocation” (Mertens (2003)) where prices are only defined
up to a normalization factor λ, so that P (TzE) is an open half-line. To get rid of
this, and in order to recover a (possibly discontinuous) ordinary differential equation on
which Filippovs’ theory applies, it suffices, again, to adopt a conventional normalization
rule in such degenerate cases – for instance, one could normalize prices into the unit
sphere. Let us denote by P˜ (Tz(t)E) the resulting (discontinuous) price function. We
can now complete our definition of trade curves by replacing the so far unspecified word
“solution” with Filippov solution in the following rewriting of (24):
(p(t), x˙(t)) = f(z(t)) :=
(
P˜ x(Tz(t)E), X(Tz(t)E)
)
. (34)
Now, Filippov’s set-valued map Gf associated to the vector field f is easily seen to be
upper semi-continuous, non-empty, convex-, and compact-valued, and locally bounded.
In particular, local boundedness comes from the fact that, x˙(t) being feasible, it is
uniformly bounded, while the cash-in-advance constraints (10) and the continuity of
the monetary policy M(·) imply the local boundedness of quasi-flow prices. Thus the
Theorem is a consequence of a classical existence result for differential inclusions, e.g.,
in Aubin & Cellina (1984 chap. 2) 
Remark. Of course, we do not use the kind of trick applied here in order to recover
a vector field for Theorem 2 since, there, what is at stake is precisely the nominal
determinacy of prices, while the preceding proof, being only concerned with existence,
allows itself to artificially circumvent the price indeterminacy.
In order to prove Theorem 2, we need to recall some technical background material
borrowed from algebraic geometry. The appropriate mathematical set-up for introducing
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the class of semi-analytic economies is that of 0-minimal Tarski systems (see Coste
(2000)). However, we content ourselves, here, with the more modest class of semi-
analytic sets — which is quite sufficient for our purposes.
A subset X ⊂ Rn is semi-analytic if, for each y ∈ Rn, there is an open neighborhood
U of y such that U ∩X is the finite union of sets defined by real analytic equalities and
inequalities. Formally, U ∩X is the finite disjoint union of sets of the form {x | fi(x) =
αi, gj(x) > βj , 1 ≤ i ≤ M, 1 ≤ j ≤ N
}
, where fi and gj : Rn → R are real-analytic
functions.
A function f : Rn → Rm is said to be semi-analytic whenever its graph, Graph
f ⊂ Rn+m, is so.
A subclass of the category of semi-analytic sets is provided by the semi-algebraic
sets, i.e., those that are obtained from the definition of a semi-analytic set after hav-
ing replaced “real-analytic” by “polynomial”. Many transcendental functions are semi-
analytic but not semi-algebraic: so are the restrictions of the exponential function, the
logarithm and the trigonometric functions to compact subsets of their domains. Com-
positions, algebraic combinations, and derivatives of semi-analytic functions are semi-
analytic, but indefinite integrals are not. Neither are the exponential, the logarithm and
the trigonometric functions on their entire domains.
Proof of Theorem 2.
We first claim that, given ω >> 0, the set of preferences representable by a semi-
analytic utility is dense in the space of C2 utilities satisfying the standard smoothness
assumptions. This follows from the standard proof showing that smooth preferences are
dense in the space of C2 utilities (see, e.g., Mas-Colell (1985, Prop. 2.8.1. p. 90)) by
keeping track of the fact that every object involved in the construction of the approx-
imating sequence of smooth preferences must be semi-analytic. For this, one simply
needs to observe that:
(i) for any integer n > 0, a C∞-density function ξn : R` → R with support containing
the origin and radius ≤ 1n can be constructed so as to be semi-analytic;
(ii) If v, ξn : R` → R are finitely subanalytic, so is the restriction of the convolution
u′n(x) :=
∫
R
v(x− z)ξn(z)dz
to the compact τ . (Notice that the support of z in the integral is bounded.)
Stone-Weierstrass theorem then enables us to uniformly approximate the monetary
policy M(·) as well as expectations maps, δi(·) and µi(·) (every i), by a polynominal,
hence by a finitely sub-analytic function. Observe that approximating utilities being
semi-analytic and differentiable, so is their differential. It suffices, indeed, to express
the differential as a limit of variation rates, and to apply Tarski-Seidenberg theorem.
Thus, the graph of the map z 7→ TzE can be expressed by a finite number of polynomial
equalities and inequalities, hence it is itself semi-analytic (in fact, semi-algebraic). But
the map that associates to each tangent economy its monetary flow is semi-analytic
as well, by the same argument. Thus (cf. Coste (2000, Lemma 6.8, p. 71)), there
exists an open, semi-analytic subset R of R×M∗ such that the restriction, f|R, of the
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vector field f defined by (34) is real-analytic (hence C∞) and dim
(
(R×M∗) \R
)
<dim
(R×M∗) = C(N −1)+(N +1)(C+2)+1. Obviously, R is dense in R×M∗. It suffices
to define C := (R×M∗)\R.
The set C of critical economies being semi-analytic, it is the finite, disjoint union of
smooth submanifolds, all of them of dimension less than C(N − 1) +N(C + 2) + 2. 
Remarks
(a) At first glance, no transversality argument seems to appear in the proof of the
generic global uniqueness and smoothness of trajectories in our argument. Actually,
transversality is “hidden” behind the property that every semi-analytic set is locally
trivial. This point plays the role, in algebraic geometry, of Sard’s theorem, and is at the
heart of the fact that a finitely subanalytic map is almost everywhere real-analytic.
(b) The discussion following Theorem 2 is an informal development of the following.
Consider a trade curve x(·) crossing a C1 hypersurface S at some point x at time, say,
T . Let the interior of the feasible set τ∗ be separated by S into domains G− and G+.
The partial derivatives ∂ϕ∂xk , k = 1, ..., C(N − 1) are continuous in domains G+ and G−
up to the boundary. Let ϕ−(x) and ϕ+(x) be the limiting values of the function f at
the point x ∈ S, from the domains G− and G+ respectively. Let
h(x) := ϕ+(x)− ϕ−(x),
be the discontinuity vector at x of our vector field. Finally, let ϕ−N , ϕ
+
N , hN be the
(orthogonal) projections of the vectors ϕ−, ϕ+, h onto the normal line to S directed from
G− to G+ at the point x. Within the domains G− and G+, right and left uniqueness
of solution to (24) holds true (Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem). All we therefore need is to
study what happens in a neighborhood of the hypersurface S. The following Proposition
summarizes the various situations we may encounter:
Proposition.— (Filippov53) If S is C2 and the function h(x) = f+(x) −
f−(x) is C1 at each point x ∈ S, if, moreover, at least one of the inequalities
f−N > 0 or f
+
N < 0 (possibly different inequalities for different x) holds, the
right uniqueness for (24) occurs for a < t < b in G.
Proof of Proposition 3.
When µ > 0 for every i, the “real” and the “monetary” parts,
(
(λ(t)p(t))λ(t)>0, x˙(t)
)
and (λ(t), m˜(t)), of a monetary flow can be separated by excluding from consideration
those traders i for whom µi = 0 (who do not trade anyway). Moreover, every pseudo-
flow is of first-order so that, whithin the linear economy restricted to traders endowed
with ouside money, the pair of price ratios and net trades (λp(t))λ>0, x˙(t)) is solely
53See Filippov (1968), Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 (p. 107), Corollary 2 and Lemma 3 (p. 108) and
Theorem 2 (p. 110).
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defined by: x˙(t) is feasible, x˙i(t) ≥ −δi(t) and p(t) · x˙i(t) = 0 for every i. In other words,
(λp(t))λ>0, x˙(t)) is but a Walrasian equilibrium (in net trades) of the restriction of Tx(t)E
to people with endowed money. The gross-substitutability property (25) then follows
from Bonnisseau, Florig & Jofre´ (2001, corollary 4.2). When µ = 0, every monetary flow
is either (M > 0) a Walras equilibrium of the whole economy TzE , or autarky (M = 0):
in both cases, the result follows again. 
Proof of Proposition 4.
(i) Remark, first, that, since ∇ui(xi) >> 0, for every i, every pseudo-flow is of first-
order. Suppose that γ(x) > r ≥ 0, and that nevertheless the monetary flow of TzE
involves no-trade. Then, for every household i, the cash-in-advance constraint p · x˙+i ≤
µi
(
1+r
r
)
is trivially satisfied, whatever being people’s initial endowment in money as
well as the factor λ > 0 chosen by the clearing house in order to fix the price level pλ.
Imagine therefore that the clearing house commits to set λ > 0 and let λ→ +∞. Since,
at a monetary flow, p >> 0 by definition, this means that pλ → +∞ as well. As a
consequence, the purchasing power of the endowed money mi goes to zero and may be
ignored. At the limit, the trading opportunity for any household is to purchase goods
solely out of the borrowed money and to pay back the loan niM at the interest rate r,
out of his sales revenues – conducting all infinitesimal trades at p∗. To be more precise,
consider the limiting price ratios given by p∗, where:
p∗c := lim
λ→∞
pλc∑
k p
λ
k
, every c,
and let us denote by Bi(p
λ, µλ, r), the budget set of agent i defined by those infinites-
imal trades x˙i ≥ −δi such that the cash-in-advance constraint (10) and the no-default
constraint (11) are satisfied. As shown by Lemma 3, this is equivalent to:
pλ · x˙+i +
1
1 + r
pλ · x˙−i ≤ µi.
The budget set being therefore homogeneous with respect to (p, µ), one has:
Bi(p
λ, µλ, r) = Bi
( pλ
|pλ |` 1
,
µ
|pλ |` 1
, r
)
where |pλ |` 1 :=
∑
k p
λ
k . As λ→∞, we have the set convergence of this budget set towards
Bi(p
∗, 0, r). If, now, x˙i is vi-optimal in Bi
(
pλ
|pλ |`
1
, µ|pλ |`
1
, r
)
, its limit, x˙i → 0, must be
vi-optimal in Bi(p
∗, 0, r). In the same way as in Theorem 2 of Dubey & Geanakoplos
(2003a), this is tantamount to performing standard Walrasian trades at p∗ but consuming
only the fraction 1/(1 + r) of purchases. In turn, a change of variable shows that this
may be viewed as performing the whole Walrasian net trades via modified utilities vri
defined as follows:
vri (x˙i) := vi(x˙i(r)),
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where x˙i(r) is defined as in (26). Thus, no-trade is a Walras allocation for (v
r
i )i at prices
p∗, and must be Pareto-optimal wrt (vri )i. Since r < γ(x), 0 is also Pareto optimal
with respect to (v
γ(x)
i )i. But we know from Lemma 2 in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a)
that there are no local gains to γ-diminished trades in TzE if, and only if, the (concave
but non-linear) economy (vγi )i has a no-trade Walras equilibrium. This contradicts the
gains-to-trade hypothesis γ(x) > 0. So, no-trade cannot be a monetary flow of TzE .
(ii) is a direct consequence of Theorem 6 in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a). There,
it is proven that, under the stated condition, no individual can have effective trades
since she could then be able to improve her short-run welfare by slightly perturbing
her trades. The same argument shows, here, that the unique monetary flow must be
no-trade. Details are left to the reader. 
Proof of Theorem 3.
(i) Define the Lyapounov function V : τ → R by:
V(x) =
∑
i
ui(xi).
For every trade curve solving (24), one has for a.e. t > 0:
d
dt
V(x(t)) =
∑
i
∇ui(xi(t)) · x˙i(t).
It follows from Proposition 4 that ddtV(x(t)) = 0 ⇐⇒ x(t) ∈ θ, otherwise,
d
dtV(x(t)) > 0. Indeed, if x(t) is locally Pareto-optimal, then Proposition 4 implies
that no-trade is the unique monetary flow of the tangent market attached to x, so that
d
dtV(x(t)) = 0. Conversely, if ddtV(x(t)) = 0, then ∇ui(x(t)) · x˙i = 0 for every type
of household i. Let (p(t), m˜(t), x˙(t)) be a monetary flow of Tz(t)E , the tangent market
corresponding to x(t). Under the standard smoothness assumptions, since µ(t) > 0
and δi(t) > 0 for every i, every pseudo-flow is of first-order so that the pair of price
ratios and net trades (λp(t))λ>0, x˙(t)) is solely defined by: x˙(t) is feasible, x˙i(t) ≥ −δi(t)
and p(t) · x˙i(t) = 0 for every i. One therefore gets from the duality theorem on linear
programming, for every i, that ∇ui(xi(t)) · x˙i(t) = 0 for every i ⇒ x˙(t) = 0 (see, e.g.,
Champsaur & Cornet 1990, Lemma 2 for details).
Now, it follows from the properties of the Lyapounov function V(·) and from Champ-
saur, Dre`ze & Henry (1977), that every limit-point x∗ of a solution of (34) belongs to θ.
(That every solution admits at least one limit-point follows from the compactness of τ .)
(ii) Proposition 4 and the stated condition imply that, for a time set of positive
length, 0 ∈ Gf (x(t)). Therefore, x(t) is a rest-point of the Filippov’s solution of (34).
(iii) Take x ∈ θ, and some neighborhood V of x in τ . Since V is continuous, let v > 0
be the maximum of V over the frontier V \ V◦ . Consider, now, the subset U := {y ∈
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τ | V(y) = v + ε} ∩ V . Clearly, U is included in V , contains x, and if a solution starts
in U , it cannot escape from U . Hence, x is locally stable.
(iv) That the trade curves xk(·) are identical on [ta, tb] is a consequence of the fact
that, as already observed in the proof of Proposition 3 above, when µ > 0 and δi >> 0,
the “real” and the “monetary” parts,
(
(λ(t)p(t))λ(t)>0, x˙(t)
)
and (λ(t), m˜(t)) can be
separated. The real part is independent from M(t): Only the price normalization factor
λ(t) > 0 and the amounts of borrowed money m˜i(t) depend upon M(t). 
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